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L Introduction
Every year, over one million acres of prime crop land are lost to the
sprawling growth of suburban areas in the United States.' Open fields and
wildlife habitat are plowed under for the construction of endless rows of new
houses. At the same time, traditional town centers collapse, giving way to
faceless strip malls at the edge of town. In many cases, the new developments
blur into one another, distinguishable only by subdivision name: Eagle's
Landing, Wild View, Goose Haven.2 Those names evoke the land's rural
heritage, conjuring up images of pastoral tranquillity. Ironically, those
appellations describe that which has been lost, rather than that which remains.
Are these changes merely the work of free market forces? Do they
simply represent the basic, frontier instinct of Americans to spread out across
the continent in the quest for that special plot of land that offers space and
privacy and safety from the turmoil of the cities?3 Not necessarily. Although
many Americans freely choose the comforts of new subdivisions over estab-
lished neighborhoods, many are motivated to purchase new homes by forces
other than personal taste and free choice. What can account for this distor-
tion? One surprising culprit may be the rollover rule of former § 1034 of the
Internal Revenue Code (Code).4
1. See Keith Schneider & Florence Schneider, America's Farthest-Reaching Environ-
mental Issue, GREAT LAKEs BULL., Winter 1997, at 6, 6 (citing estimate of American Farmland
Trust).
2. See HOME BUILDERS ASs'N OF METROPOLITANDER,BOULDER COUNTY CHAPTER,
TOUR OFNEW HOMES (May 3,4, 10, 11, 1997).
3. See generally Henry R. Richmond, From Sea to Shining Sea: Manifest Destiny and
the National Land Use Dilemma, 13 PACE L. REV. 327 (1993) (discussing statutory approaches
to containing development of farmland).
4. I.R.C. § 1034 (1994) (repealed 1997).
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Although many writers have linked relentless suburban growth to federal
tax policies such as the home mortgage interest deduction, few have blamed
former § 1034.' That section created a home sale preference, permitting home
owners who sold their principal residences at a profit to defer tax liability (to
"rollover" the gain). The tax relief, however, was limited by an important
prerequisite: to qualify for the benefit of § 1034, taxpayers were required to
"buy up" by purchasing another home of greater or equal value within two
years of the sale.' The rollover rule first appeared as § 318(a) of the Revenue
Act of 195 1' After minor amendment, at the time of its repeal in 1997, the
rule provided:
Ifproperty... used by the taxpayer as his principal residence is sold by
him and, within... 2 years... [anew residence] is purchased and used by the
taxpayer as his principal residence, gain (if any) from such sale shall be
recognizedonlytotheextentthatthetaxpayer's adustedsalesprice... ofthe
oldresidence exceeds the taxpayer's cost ofpurchasing the new residence.
Thus, for almost halfa century, the rollover rule created a powerful incentive
for home sellers to buy up to qualify for tax deferral. Every year, over four
million families sell their homes.' Many complied with the buy-up prerequi-
site, with fewer than 4% of home sales triggering tax liability for capital
gains."
Was the rollover rule a desirable provision of our national tax policy?
A cursory examination misleadingly suggests that § 1034 simply created a
benevolent preference for home sellers. When enacting the precursor to
§ 1034 in 1951, Congress perceived an urgent need to eliminate the hardship"
that taxing the "ephemeral profits" 2 from home sales created. Congress noted
5. See infra notes 21,309-10 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part I.A.
7. RevenueActof 1951, Pub. L.No. 82-183, § 318,65 Stat. 452,494 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 112(n)(1) (1939)).
8. I.R.C. § 1034(a) (1994) (repealed 1997) (emphasis added).
9. See FY98Budget Education Issues: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter Education Hearings] (statement of Donald C. Lubick,
Acting Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Dep't oftheTreasury), available in 1997 WL 8219493;
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORs, REAL ESTATE OUTLOOK, MARKETTRENDS & INSIGHT,
Feb. 1998, at 13.
10. Some ofthese home sales were exempt from capital gains taxes because of a one-time
exclusion of up to $125,000 of gain, previously available to taxpayers age 55 and over.
Education Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Donald C. Lubick).
11. H.R. REP. No. 82-586, at 27 (1951), reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1781, 1808
,(noting that then-current tax law created hardship by taxing profits from home sales as capital
gains).
12. 96 CONG. REC. APP. A1983 (1950) (statement of Rep. Camp).
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that such profits were often the product of inflation, and the taxpayer would
need to reinvest the entire proceeds from the sale of the first home to purchase
a similar replacement home. 3 In such a case, Congress believed it inequitable
to exact an income tax on proceeds that were not clearly "income." 4
Despite its laudable goal of supporting home ownership, § 1034 unwit-
tingly promoted the needless destruction of farmland and the unchecked
proliferation of suburban housing developments. How did these unintended
consequences come about? In many regions of the country, housing prices
increase as one moves out of the city center and into the county. 5 As a result,
buying up may have required the purchase of a relatively expensive, new
suburban home. The tax distortion is particularly evident in communities that
experienced a significant influx of new residents from more expensive re-
gions. In that case, existing homes were simply too inexpensive to satisfy the
buy-up requirement and the new residents created a tax-induced demand for
the construction of luxury homes encroaching upon the surrounding country-
side.
This Article is a requiem for the rollover rule, which existed for forty-six
years until its repeal in 1997.16 In dismantling the rule, Congress eliminated
the buy-up requirement, but failed to realize all of the rule's adverse conse-
quences.'7 Why should we examine a section of the Code that is no longer in
effect? The answer is quite straightforward: tax reform is fluid, subject to
changing political philosophies. Congress can repeal and re-enact provisions
of the tax code in rapid succession. 8 As a result, a nation cannot have an
informed, rational, and constructive tax policy on home sales without a
continuing effort to understand fully the choices and mistakes of the past.
This Article provides an expos6 of the unintended consequences of the roll-
13. See 97 CONG. REC. 11,721 (1951) (statement of Sen. Long).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Thomas E. Bier & Ivan Maric, IRS Homeseller Provision and Urban
Decline, 16 J. URB. AFF. 141, 143 (1994) (noting higher prices of homes sold in suburbs of
Cleveland than within Cleveland city limits). See also infra Part VI.B.3.
16. See infra Part VIII.B. In 1997, Congress repealed § 1034 (including the rollover
rule), but created a new home sale preference in an amended § 121. See infra Part VIII.B.
17. See infra Part VIII.B.
18. In 1986, for example, Congress repealed the preference for individual long-term
capital gains, but "kept in place all of the complex definitional and computational parapherna-
lia." MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 16.01, at 299 (1994). Seven
years later, Congress reintroduced the capital gains preference as a reaction to the increase in
tax rates. Id. at 298-300; see also Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the
AcceleratingRate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913,914 (1987)
(viewing tax legislation as contract and explaining accelerating rate of tax change as representa-
tive of shift from longer- to shorter-term contracts between legislators and private interests).
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over rule and thereby offers insurance against the resurrection of the rule by
some future Congress.
This Article offers no opinion as to whether tax breaks for home owners
are justifiable in theory. Rather, it contends simply that in practice the roll-
over rule proved to be an ill-conceived mechanism for limiting such preferen-
tial treatment. In other words, in the specific case of § 1034, the detrimental
effects of the rollover rule and its buy-up requirement overshadowed any
benefits that the home sale preference created. Part II presents the broader
context of § 1034, discussing federal policies favoring home owners over
renters and favoring capital gains over ordinary income. The § 1034 home
sale preference was consistent with both of these long-standing predilections.
Part III discusses the origin of the rollover rule, which was patterned after
1921 legislation relating to the government requisition or condemnation of
ships during World War I. In that Part, this Article questions whether the
analogy between involuntary conversions and home sales was an appropriate
model for § 1034. Part IV examines the legislative history of the Revenue Act
of 1951, highlighting how the vagaries of domestic politics at the inception of
the cold war may have hastened the enactment of the rollover rule, without an
adequate discussion of its potential to dominate land-use patterns and commu-
nity structure. Parts V and VI argue that the rollover rule may have had three
unintended consequences: (a) over-investment in housing, (b) the inflation of
housing prices, and (c) the conversion of farmland into suburban housing.
The Article tests these three hypotheses through case studies of the housing
markets of Santa Clara County, California, and Boulder County, Colorado.
Part VII elaborates upon the third hypothesis by describing the negative
effects of suburbanization, including the hidden economic, social, and envi-
ronmental costs of sprawl development. Part VIII outlines the demise of the
rollover rule, as Congress expanded the home sale preference in 1997 by
repealing § 1034 of the Code.
II. The "American Dream" Narrative: Tax Preferences for Home Owners
Two diverse forces - one philosophical, one economic - facilitated the
1951 enactment of the predecessor to § 1034. First, the home sale preference
created by § 1034 was but one of many federal policies favoring home owner-
ship, all supported by our national reverence for the sanctity of the family
dwelling. Second, the tax advantage for home sellers was expressed as a
capital gains preference, justified by the same economic arguments that have
prevailed in maintaining a general preference for long-term capital gains
almost continuously since 1921. This Part addresses two questions basic to
an understanding of § 1034: Why does the law favor home owners? Further,
why does the law favor capital gains over ordinary income?
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The family hearth has long been a treasured icon of our society, with
home ownership at the heart of the American Dream. 9 The vision of a nation
of home owners is perceived as far more than a luxury or convenience - it is
seen as the "foundation of all society.""0 Federal policy reflects this respect
for home ownership through tax preferences such as the home mortgage
interest deduction,2' the real property tax deduction,' and the home sale
preference of § 121' and § 1034 of the Code,24 as well as through nontax
benefits such as federally insured home mortgages.'
The preferences have been the subject of a fairly substantial body of
critical literature. Commentators have criticized the home mortgage interest
deduction as potentially inequitable,26 racially skewed,' and as an incentive
for the destruction of wetlands, other sensitive landscapes, and endangered
19. See, e.g., Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical
Evaluation ofthe Federal Government's Promotion ofHome Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L.REV.
373, 374 n. 1 (1994) (quoting Radio Address to the Nation on the Economic Plan, 29 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 331, 332 (Feb. 27, 1993) (President William J. Clinton) (stating that home
ownership is "an essential part ofthe American dream we're working hard to restore"); President
Lyndon Johnson, Message to Congress on the Crisis of the Cities (Feb. 22, 1968) ("Home
ownership is acherished dream and achievement ofmost Americans."), reprinted in 114 CoNG.
REc. 3956,3957 (1968); President Franklin Roosevelt, Addressto theUnited States Savings and
Loan League (Nov. 16, 1942) ("[A] nation of home owners, of people who own a real share in
their own land, is unconquerable."), in N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1942, at 35).
20. 78 CONG. REc. 11,182(1934)(statementofRep. Sirovich), quotedin Forrester, supra
note 19, at 374-75 n.1.
21. I.R.C. § 163(h) (1994) (allowing deduction of interest on up to one million dollars
of debt incurred to acquire taxpayer's principal residence and one other residence). The
deduction was projected to cost the U.S. Treasury $253.9 billion for the period 1994-98. Oliver
A. Houck, On the Law ofBiodiversity andEcosystem Management, 81 MINN. L. REV. 869,881
n.36 (1997) (citing STAFF oF JoINTCoMM. ONTAXATION, 103DCONG., EsTIMATES OFFEDERAL
TAX EXPENDiTtREs FORFISCAL YEARS 1994-1998, at 13 (Comm. Print 1993)).
22. I.R.C. § 164(a)(1) (allowing for deduction of state and local property taxes).
23. See discussion infra Part VIII.A.
24. Although § 1034 was repealed in 1997, an expanded version of the home sale
preference now appears in I.R.C. § 121. See discussion infra Part VIII.B.
25. See National Housing Act, ch. 847, § 203, 48 Stat. 1246, 1248-49 (1934) (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1709 (1994)).
26. See CHIRELSTEIN,supra note 18, 7.04, at 166-68 (noting that deduction exacerbates
mortgagors' financial advantage over renters caused by "inconsistency in the law... [whereby]
the imputed rental value of owner-occupancy is not taxable, while cash rental payments are not
deductible").
27. See Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue
Code, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 751,774-75 (arguing that "the tax benefits of deductions are always
a function of income bracket [and,] ... [therefore,] [i]f homeowning blacks, on average, have
a lower income than homeowning whites, this principle alone assures that the tax benefits of
deducting mortgage interest and property taxes are racially skewed").
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species.28 Despite these criticisms, home owners have maintained their
favored status for well over halfa century.29 For example, in 1986 Congress
eliminated deductions of "personal interest," but retained a major exception
for the deduction of home mortgage interest. Similarly, flat-tax proposals
may garner a certain measure of popular support but "hit the political wall
when they consider eliminating deductions for home-mortgage interest.'
1
Political support for these home owner preferences is buttressed by pious
rhetoric as much as by careful logic. The language emphasizes the sacrosanct
nature of the family home, couched in terms of the American Dream or, more
recently, in terms of "family values."32 One senator described the home
mortgage interest deduction as "one of the most sacred parts of the Tax
Code, 33 even though commentators cannot precisely identify the deduction's
effect upon the affordability of housing.34 Likewise, legislators touted a
recent package of tax reform measures, including the expansion of the home
sale preference,35 as changes that would promote the future of the family: "By
letting hard-working Americans keep more of their own money, we allow
them to preserve their family, prepare for their own future, and invest in the
nation's economy."36 In a nation where home owners comprise over 60% of
28. See Houck, supra note 21, at 880-81 (arguing that federal subsidies encourage devel-
opment of sensitive natural areas); Oliver A. Houck, Reflections on the Endangered Species
Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 689, 696-97 (1995) (arguing that mortgage interest deduction and other
federal subsidies support development projects, some of which impact endangered species).
29. Beginning in 1934, for example, Congress provided for federally insured home
mortgages. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
30. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2246
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
31. Erik M. Jensen, Frontiers of Tax Reform, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 253,256 (1996)
(book review).
32. For an essay on the use of the family values motif in the 1992 presidential campaign,
see Lance Morrow, Family Values: The Republican Pitch Seems Cynical, But It Goes to the
Soul of What Kind of Country Americans Want, TIME, Aug. 31, 1992, at 22, 27. "The Republi-
can meaning of family values tends to point toward a cultural ideal (two-parent heterosexual
households, hard work, no pornography, a minimal tolerance of the aberrant)." Id.
33. 132 CoNG. REc. 14,824 (1986) (statement of Sen. Pryor) (supporting home mortgage
interest deduction during debate over Tax Reform Act of 1986).
34. The Honorable Leslie B. Samuels, Remarks at the Federal Bar Association Annual
Tax Law Conference (March 6, 1996), in Section of Tax'n Rep., July 1989, at 1, 7 (Summer
1996) (noting that elimination of home mortgage interest and property tax deductions "could
have a significant effect on housing prices, although it is difficult to predict precisely how such
effects would play out").
35. See discussion infra Part VIII.B.
36. 143 CONG. REc. S8405 (daily ed. July 31, 1997) (statement of Sen. Smith); see also
id. at S6716 (daily ed. June 27, 1997) (statement of Sen. Graham) (discussing reduction of
capital gains tax rate). Senator Graham stated: "In particular, I would like to draw your
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the population,37 the emotionally charged family values language has a
superficial appeal that may tempt legislators to support home preferences as
politically expedient measures, without a rigorous analysis of the subtle
consequences of the preferences. The home sale preference of former § 1034
was subject to just such an infirmity. Congress enacted the provision without
substantial controversy in 1951 and without careful inquiry into precisely how
to delineate the contours of the preference. As a result, the poorly conceived
rollover rule governed over a generation of home sales.
A. The Home Sale Preference of Former § 1034
Since 1951, the Code has provided a consistent preference for the sale of
personal residences.38 SupposeXpurchased a home in 1940 for $10,000. IfX
sells the residence in 1951 for $15,000, thenXhas realized a gain of $5,000.7
But should the gain from the home sale be taxed just like any other capital
gain? As a matter of social policy, is it fair or wise to tax that $5,000 "profit"?
IfXbuys a replacement-home of similar size and quality, then Xmay need to
spend the entire $15,000 from the sale of the old home. In essence, Xhas
simply traded one home for another. The profit may be illusory and tempo-
rary, providing no source of funds from which Xcan draw to pay a tax on the
so-called gain. Therefore, if a capital gains tax is imposed on the sale, X's net
worth will be decreased by the amount of the tax. Congress feared that
imposing a capital gains tax upon such home sales made it "harder for [tax-
attention to a provision that will have considerable impact on our Nation's families: the capital
gains exclusion for homeowners who sell their primary residence." Id. For other references
to the linkage of family values and federal policy, see Forrester, supra note 19, at 374 n.1 ("I
believe that those on welfare, what they really want is a piece of the American dream:
homeownership, a good job, opportunities for their children, and strong, loving families.")
(quoting Remarks on Arrival in Appleton, Wisconsin, 1992-93 PUB. PAPERS 1188 (July 27,
1992) (President George Bush)); Jerome Kurtz, The Interest Deduction Under our Hybrid Tax
System: Muddling TowardAccommodation, 50 TAX L. REV. 153, 189 (1995) (stating that "the
tax law has always treated the deduction for home mortgage interest with a rare degree of
deference").
37. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., HOMEOWNERSHIP (last modified Mar.
31, 1997) <http:/www.census.govlhheslhousinglcensus/owner.html> [hereinafter HOMEOWN-
ERSHIP]; see also BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'TOF COM., CENSUS OF HOUSING 1 (1990);
Peter Passell, The Easy One in Tax Breaks: Who's Against Homeowners?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
31, 1996, at 33 (discussing proposed legislation that would eliminate capital gains taxes on most
home sales).
38. See Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183, § 318,65 Stat. 452, 494 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 1034).
39. A similar hypothetical was posed during the debate over the Revenue Act of 1951.
See H.R. REP. No. 82-586, at 28, 111-13 (1951), reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1781, 1808-
09, 1898-1900.
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payers] to maintain [their] former standard of living,"4 forcing home sellers
to "dip into [their] savings" in order to pay the tax.41
In 1951, Congress provided relief from this perceived hardship by
enacting the predecessor to § 1034 of the Internal Revenue Code.42 The relief
provided to home sellers, however, was contingent upon the satisfaction of
several conditions. Perhaps the least debated of those conditions -the buy-up
requirement of the rollover rule - required taxpayers to purchase a replace-
ment home of greater or equal value than the former residence to defer taxa-
tion. That is, gain from the sale of the old residence was recognized only to
the extent that the sale price of the old residence (minus various sales-related
expenses) exceeded the cost of the new residence. 3 The net effect of this
provision was to encourage home sellers to buy up to defer taxation.
The political groundwork for this home sale provision had been laid
thirty years earlier when Congress enacted the first general capital gains
preference in 1921.44 The same reluctance to tax capital gains that prevailed
during that early debate played a role in the 1951 passage of the home sale
preference. Although the preferential treatment of capital gains had been
firmly established by mid-century, a lingering ambivalence toward the relative
merits of earned and unearned income retained sufficient currency to prompt
continuing debate. It was during this time, for example, that Professor Walter
Blum wrote his now-classic article, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains
Arguments.45 An examination of the larger historical context of capital gains
taxation is an indispensable prelude to an understanding of the home sale
preference.
B. The Ambivalent Taxation of Capital Gains
The taxation of home sale profits is only part of the larger issue of the
proper tax treatment of capital gains in general. For almost a decade after the
40. 97 CONG. REc. 6961 (1951) (statement of Rep. Forand).
41. Id. (citation omitted). "Payment of a capital gains tax when an individual switches
homes may be areal hardship, because ordinarily [the individual] needs as much cash as he can
lay his hands on." Id. at 6962.
42. H.R. REP. No. 82-586, at 27, reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1781, 1808; see
I.R.C.§ 1034 (1994) (repealed 1997).
43. For the purpose of determining whether or not gain was deferred, the sales price of
the old residence was adjusted to reflect "the amount realized, reduced by the aggregate of the
expenses for work performed on the old residence in order to assist in its sale." I.R.C.
§ 1034(b)(1) (1994) (repealed 1997).
44. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206(b), 42 Stat. 227, 233.
45. Walter J. Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXEs 247
(1957).
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enactment of the sixteenth amendment," it remained unclear as a constitu-
tional matter whether Congress could tax capital gains. In the early 1920s, the
Supreme Court decided several issues that cleared the way for the full taxation
of capital gains. Nevertheless, Congress continued to demonstrate a reluc-
tance to tax capital gains, at least at the same level as ordinary income.
In Eisner v. Macomber,47 the Supreme Court considered whether Con-
gress could tax stock dividends as income.48 In deciding that Congress lacked
such authority, the Court stated that "[t]he essential and controlling fact is that
the stockholder has received nothing out of the company's assets for his
separate use and benefit."49 In language that led to the now-familiar require-
ment that income is not taxable until it has been realized,5" the Court observed
that despite the fact that the stockholder "is the richer because of an increase
of his capital, at the same time.., he has not realized or received any income
in the transaction."''5  Although the Court's opinion implied that the realiza-
tion requirement is one of constitutional dimension, many subsequent com-
mentators have agreed that the requirement is simply a rule of administrative
convenience rather than a constitutional mandate. 2
Stated in the affirmative, Macomber might have been construed to stand
forthe proposition that capital gainswere constitutionallytaxable, atleastwhere
a realization event has occurred. Instead of resolving the taxability of capital
gains, however, the decision created more uncertainty and provoked congres-
sional outrage53 against the Court's intrusion into Congress's authority in the
46. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
47. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
48. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 199 (1920). The Standard Oil Company had
distributed surplus profits to defendant-stockholder in the form of additional shares of stock.
Id. at 200-01.
49. Id. at211.
50. In its purest form, the Haig-Simons definition ofincome would call for the imposition
of an income tax on annual increases in wealth. Due primarily to the administrative difficulties
inherent in that approach, such a regime has been eschewed in favor of an approach under
which income is not taxed until gains have been realized. See generally JOSEPH BANKMAN ET
AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX 123-94 (1996).
51. Macomber, 252 U.S. at212.
52. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 18, 5.01, at 71; see also Marjorie E. Komhauser, The
Origins of Capital Gains Taxation: What's Law Got to Do With It?, 39 Sw. L.J. 869,874 n.23
(1985) (stating that, although Macomber was "generally understood [at the time] to constitu-
tionally mandate realization,]... [t]oday, the realization requirement is generally adhered to
for administrative convenience since the taxation of unrealized gain would require complex
annual valuations").
53. See Kornhauser, supra note 52, at 922-23 (noting that Macomber decision caused "an
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tax arena. 4 The issue was not resolved until the following year when the
Court, in Merchants'Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka,55 held that capital gains
were indeed taxable "income" within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amend-
ment. 6 Merchants'Loan signaled a retreat from judicial activism with respect
to the congressional taxing power. 7 The decision freed Congress to base its tax
treatment of capital gains upon pragmatic, rather than constitutional, concerns.
In 1921, within months after the Court rendered its decision in Mer-
chants'Loan, Congress retreated from its newly confirmed constitutional
authority by enacting the first capital gains preference. 8 Although Congress
did not articulate a comprehensive rationale for the preference,59 commenta-
tors generally cite at least two arguments in its support. First, the preference
may counteract the adverse effects of the phenomenon called "bunching,"
under which gains that have accrued over many years (such as the apprecia-
tion in value of a personal residence) are taxed only in the year that a profit
has been realized.6" Consistent with this rationale, one can understand the
outpouring of protest in Congress, which did not abate for years and which included proposals
for constitutional amendments to permit the taxation of stock dividends and state and local
income").
54. Id at 921-22 ("Congress and the public perceived the Macomber case as severely
disturbing the balance of power [between Congress and the Court].").
55. 255 U.S. 509 (1921).
56. Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 517-21 (1921). For an
interesting discussion of the Court's cursory treatment of the issue, despite diverse and impas-
sioned contemporary opinion, see Kornhauser, supra note 52, at 879.
57. See Kornhauser, supra note 52, at 923-25 (arguing that Merchants' Loan and other
capital gains cases decided contemporaneously reflected "the Court's acceptance of [Con-
gress's] power in the income tax area").
58. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206(b), 42 Stat. 227, 233 (taxing capital gains at
maximum rate of 12.5%); see Komhauser, supra note 52, at 928 ("[Ihe existence of a broad
power to tax, however, did not mean that the power had to be exercised. Congress retained
legislative discretion to fashion complex revenue-producing statutes to meet changing needs
and conditions.").
59. See CHimELSTEIN, supra note 18, 16.02, at 301 ("Curiously in view of its signifi-
cance to the revenues, the capital gain preference has never received a systematic exposition in
any official source. Congressional committee reports, debates, etc., contain little on the subject
ofunderlying policy, apartfrom occasional references to 'fairness,' 'incentives,' and the like.").
60. One commentator provides the following illustration:
If stock is purchased at $100 a share in Year I and is finally sold in Year 5 for
$150, the $50 gain then realized may be the sum of a series of unrealized gains
which accrued over the five-year period. Since, historically, our rate-structure has
been progressive, if we include the entire $50 in Year 5 just because the stock
happened to be sold in that year, the investor's tax could be considerably greater
than if the gain had been taken into account ratably over the five-year holding
period.
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first preference as a congressional reaction to the Macomber realization
requirement that served to mitigate the perceived harsh effect of the realiza-
tion rule.6' A second argument asserts that the capital gains preference
preserves the mobility of capital from existing assets into more profitable
investments. Under this view, taxpayers may be "locked in" to existing
investments if the sale of current assets triggers a tax of sufficient magnitude
to make the transaction too expensive to undertake.62 As a result, a capital
gains preference may remove the disincentive against capital mobility, giving
investors freedom to make efficient investment decisions without fear of
negative tax consequences.
Although experts continue to debate the merits of the general capital
gains preference,63 it has been a persistent part of the tax landscape for over
seventy-five years.' Capital gains have not escaped taxation altogether,
however, and a variety of mechanisms have limited the preference since
1921.65 The next Part considers how and why Congress chose to limit the
preference and focuses on the specific home preference of § 1034.
III The Restrictive Subtext: The Rollover Rule
Why did Congress create a special preference for home sales, only to
limit its applicability to cases in which taxpayers bought more expensive
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 18, 16.02, at 302; see also Blum, supra note 45, at 253. Professor
Blum argues that the bunching justification is weak because "while the prescription fits the
disease, the disease itself is unnecessary." Id. Instead of a preference, he suggests that the
obvious solution for the bunching problem is to adopt an averaging mechanism to spread out
capital gains over a block of years. Id.
61. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 18, 16.02, at 302 (stating that "preferential treatment can
be seen as a rough-and-ready way of mitigating the impact of progressive rates on income that
is 'bunched' into a single taxable year"); see also Anita Wells, Legislative History of Treatment
of Capital Gains Under the Federal Income Tax, 1913-1948, 2 NAT'L TAX J. 12, 15 (1949)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 67-350,10-11 (1921) for the proposition that the sale of capital assets has
been "seriously retarded by the fact that gains and profits earned over a series of years are under
the present law taxed as a lump sum (and the amount of surtax greatly enhanced thereby) in the
year in which the profit is realized").
62. See Blum, supra note 45, at 256-58 (describing this effect as "probably the most
widely publicized argument against taxing capital gains").
63. See generally Colloquium on Capital Gains, 48 TAXL. REV. 315 (1993) (presenting
colloquium on issue of desirability of capital gains preference).
64. The general capital gains preference disappeared briefly between 1986 (preference
eliminated by the Tax Reform Act of 1986) and 1990 (modest preference reinstated by the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990). See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 18, 16.01, at 298-301;
I.R.C. § 1 (1994) (as amended by Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-508
§ 11101, 104 Stat. 400, 404-05).
65. See infra Part III.
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replacement homes? An obvious response suggests that Congress wanted to
ensure that the income tax would generate sufficient federal revenues to meet
the nation's financial needs. That response, however, is unsatisfying. It does
not explain, for example, why Congress amended the home sale preference in
1997 to exclude all but 0.25% of home sale gains from taxable income.6 The
taxation of an insignificant percentage of home sellers appears tailored to
goals of a philosophical rather than economic nature.
Such symbolic qualifications on tax relief may be the product of our
inconsistent national attitudes toward wealth. 7 In one sense, the wealthy are
regarded with disdain because "Americans imbue earned income with an aura
of morality and virtuousness that unearned income, particularly inherited
income, does not have., 6' At the same time, however, the wealthy represent
the "apotheosis of the American dream" by proving that "anyone can achieve
anything by dint of merit, rather than by class or privilege."'69 In the political
sphere, these competing philosophical views play out as a battle of rich
against poor. For example, 1997 tax reform measures reduced the maximum
tax rate on capital gains from 28% to 20%.7o The legislative debate high-
lighted the philosophical schism in our views of wealth. Opponents of the
reduction questioned whether investment is of greater merit than work and
argued that there must be some "reasonable limitation" on the capital gains tax
benefit.7 They noted that the benefit provides a disproportionate advantage
to the wealthy and that 0.5% of taxpayers receive 50% of the nation's capital
gains.72 In contrast, proponents of the expanded preference emphasized the
admirable qualities of the wealthy, arguing that "millionaires come from risk-
taking, millionaires come from [job-creating] entrepreneurial activity."'73
66. See infra Part VIII.B.
67. See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes
Toward Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119 (1994).
68. Id. at 119.
69. Id. at 169.
70. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 311, 111 Stat. 788, 831-32.
71. See 143 CONG. REC. S6397 (daily ed. June 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. Dorgan)
(describing investor as one who "takes a shower in the morning, does not get dirty during the
day, does not sweat, sits in a chair someplace and invests").
72. Id.
73. Id. at S6398 (statement of Sen. Bennett). The distinction between the wealthy and
the nonwealthy is fluid, potentially changing during the course of one's lifetime:
Most Americans do not start off in a high income bracket. They work up to it
over the years and reach a peak somewhere in their 50s or 60s.... Census statis-
tics for 1990 show families headed by someone in the 45- to 64-year-old bracket
earning nearly double the income of families headed by someone in the 25- to 34-
year-old bracket.
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The attitude that tax breaks for home owners - however deserving- must
have some "reasonable limitation" may have influenced the buy-up require-
ment of § 1034. Beyond that, the limitation on the home sale preference may
have been simply an administrative convenience, as Congress borrowed the
rollover mechanism from the existing involuntary conversion provision.74
A. The Rollover Mechanism
With little fanfare, Congress enacted the rollover rule as a brief clause at
the end of the home sale preference, itself almost an afterthought to the
Revenue Act of 195 L' Although Congress could have excluded all home sale
profits from taxation, it adopted a more limited approach. Through the
mechanism of a qualified tax deferral - expressed through the rollover rule -
Congress restricted the preference to those transactions in which taxpayers
replaced their old homes with new residences that cost at least as much as the
adjusted sale price of the old. On its face, the rollover rule created a tempo-
rary tax deferral. In practical effect, in connection with other Code provi-
sions, that deferral often functioned as a permanent tax exclusion.76
Capital gains are not taxed until they are both realized and recognized,
concepts that postpone taxation from the year in which a taxpayer has enjoyed
an increase in wealth until some later point in time.77 As with other gains,
those associated with personal residences are not realized until the year the
property is sold rather than in the years that appreciation occurs.7" After
realization, most gains are recognized as taxable unless otherwise provided by
the Code.79 Certain transactions, however, are entitled to postponement of
taxation under various "nonrecognition" rules such as former § 1034.
When taxation of the gain from a home sale was deferred, the cost or
basis of the second residence was adjusted downward to reflect the nonrecog-
Most of the people who are called rich could more accurately be called middle-
aged or elderly. They are not a class. They are an age bracket. When they were
younger, they were usually in a lower income bracket.
143 CONG. REc. H6656 (daily ed. July 31, 1997) (statement of Rep. Crane) (quoting Thomas
Sowell, Liberals Are Mighty Generous with Definition of'the Rich,' CHI. SUN-TIMEs, July 26,
1997).
74. See infra Part III.B.
75. Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183, § 318, 65 Stat. 452, 494.
76. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
77. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 18, 16.02, at 302-05.
78. See generally Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
79. See I.R.C. § 1001(c) (1994) (stating that realized gains and losses are recognized
unless otherwise provided in Code).
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nized gain. Thus, ifXpurchased a personal residence in 1975 for $100,000
and sold it in 1985 for an adjusted sales price of $150,000,80 Xrealized a gain
of $50,000. That gain qualified for nonrecognition under § 1034 if, within
two years of the sale, Xpurchased a replacement home for at least $150,000.1
The adjusted basis of the second home (if purchased for $150,000) was
$100,000, reflecting X's entire unrecovered investment in both homes.8"
Suppose X(age 45) then sold the second home in 1995 for an adjusted sales
price of $200,000 and moved into an apartment. Because no nonrecognition
rule applied to this second sale, Xwould have been taxed on a $100,000 gain,
the amount by which the sales price of the second residence exceeded its
adjusted basis.83 Thus, after a period of deferral, Xfinally paid a tax upon the
$50,000 gain from the sale of the first home, as well as upon the $50,000 gain
from the sale of the second home.
In theory, § 1034 postponed - but did not forgive - the obligation to pay
tax on the gain from the sale of a residence. That postponement could be
justified under the theory that the taxpayer's investment had been uninter-
rupted, even though the form of the investment had changed as one home was
substituted for another.8 4 In practice, however, home owners often avoided
taxation altogether by continuously "buying up" until the taxpayer reached age
55 and qualified for a permanent exclusion from taxation of up to $125,000
of gain. 5 Furthermore, if the taxpayer held the home until death, the heirs
were taxed only to the extent that gains occurred after the taxpayer's death.86
Thus, although § 1034 specifically provided only for the deferral of taxation,
in many instances the relief it provided was the functional equivalent of a
permanent exclusion of gain from the home seller's taxable income.87
Mere deferral, however, also provided a significant benefit to the tax-
payer. In the previous exampleXrealized a $50,000 gain from the sale of the
first residence in 1985, but it was not recognized until 1995. Thus, X's tax
obligation had been deferred for a period of ten years. If the gain had been
80. See I.R.C. § 1034(b)(1) (1994) (repealed 1997) (defining adjusted sales price).
81. See 1.11C. § 1034(a) (1994) (repealed 1997) (stating how to qualify for nonrecogni-
tion of gain).
82. The adjusted basis ofthe second home equals its cost ($150,000) minus unrecognized
gain from the sale of the first home ($50,000).
83. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1994) (discussingcomputationofgainforappreciatedproperty).
84. See CHIELSTEIN, supra note 18, 15, at 289.
85. See I.11C. § 121 (1994) (amended 1997). For a discussion of§ 121 and the 1997
amendment thereof, see infra Part VIII.
86. See I.R.C. § 1014 (1994) (stating general rule that basis of property acquired from
decedent is fair market value of such property at date of decedent's death).
87. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 18, 15.02, at 296-97.
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taxable at the rate of 28%,88 then the ten-year deferral amounted to a tax-free
government loan of$14,000, the amount of tax. Assuming an interest rate of
8%, the 1985 value to Xof the tax deferral would be $6,485.9
From its inception, the rollover rule's buy-up requirement limited the
home sale preference. However, since 1921, Congress has limited other capi-
tal gains preferences by at least three mechanisms. First, preferences may be
expressed as rate differentials. Under the Revenue Act of 192 1,90 taxpayers
had the option of paying a flat tax of 12.5% on long-term capital gains, rather
than normal and surtax rates well in excess of 70%.91 Today's Code contin-
ues to implement a rate differential, taxing long-term capital gains at a maxi-
mum rate of 20% as compared to a maximum rate of 39.6% for ordinary
income.92
Second, Congress created a partial exclusion of gain from taxable income
in response to the potential inequitable results of the rate differential. In 1929,
one congressional committee observed that under the income tax rates in
effect at the time, only 1.5% of all taxpayers benefitted from the rate differen-
tial and only 0.25% received a substantial benefit from the differential.'
Subsequently, the Revenue Act of 1934 adopted a "step-scale plan" under
which up to 70% of capital gains could be excluded from ordinary income,
with the percentage varying in accordance with the length of time the taxpayer
had held assets.94 More recently, the partial exclusion mechanism of § 1202
(prior to amendment in 1993) allowed taxpayers to deduct 60% of certain
long-term capital gains from gross income.' Yet another variation of the
partial exclusion mechanism applied to older home sellers from 1964 to 1997,
allowing them to exclude up to $125,000 of gain from their gross incomes.'
88. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (1994) (imposing 28% maximum tax rate on capital gains prior to
amendment in 1997).
89. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 18, at 368. The present value (pv) of $A deferred t years
from today at an interest rate of ro is computed according to the formula: pv =A/(l + r)'. Thus,
the present value of the tax owed by Xis: pv = $14,000/(1.08)10 = $6,485.
90. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206(b), 42 Stat. 227, 233.
91. See Wells, supra note 61, at 14-15 (stating that during World War 1, combined normal
and surtax rates peaked at 77% for 1918, falling slightly to 73% for 1919 and 1920).
92. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 311, 111 Stat. 788, 831-32
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
93. See Wells, supra note 61, at 20 n.36 (citing JoINT CoMrrrEE ON INTERNAL REVE-
NUETAXATION, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTON CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES (Comm. Print 1929)).
94. Id. at 21.
95. See I.R.C. § 1202 (1985) (repealed in 1986 and reinstated in different form in 1993).
See generally CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 18, 16.01, at 298-301.
96. See I.R.C. § 121 (1994) (amended 1997) (illustrating variation of partial exclusion
of gain mechanism applied to older homesellers); see also infra Part VIII.A.
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In 1997, Congress expanded the partial exclusion to include home sellers of
all ages, finally replacing the rollover rule. 7
Yet a third mechanism provides for the qualified deferral or postpone-
ment oftaxation. Congress first applied this mechanism in 1921 to the special
case in which the sale of assets was deemed an "involuntary conversion"
rather than a voluntary sale.9" Under that provision, gain resulting from the
involuntary conversion of property into cash due to theft, fire, or condemna-
tion was not recognized as taxable if it satisfied one important requirement.
That qualification - the prototype for the rollover rule of § 1034 - required
that the proceeds be reinvested in property of a similar character to the origi-
nal property.99
Was the buy-up requirement of the rollover rule an appropriate mecha-
nism for limiting the home sale preference of § 1034? Recall first the broader
issue of whether or not capital gains in general should be taxed preferen-
tially.0 If taxation of capital gains indeed creates an impediment to the
mobility of capital,"0' then tax deferral under the rollover rule might be a good
solution to the problem.0 2 This justification for the rollover rule, however,
loses its force in the specific context of home sales. In that case, Congress
was concerned primarily about preventing hardship to home owners, rather
than promoting efficient investment choices.0 3 As an intuitive matter, a tax
levied on home sales appears more likely to reduce a family's standard of
living than a tax on the sale of profitable investments.
Ironically, as demonstrated later in this Article, Congress applied the
rollover rule in the context where it was least desirable - to home sales - thus
97. See infra Part VIII.B.
98. See infra Part III.B. In 1921, the original involuntary conversion provision allowed
for reinvested sale proceeds to be excluded permanently from taxation. Revenue Act of 1921,
ch. 136, § 214(a)(12), 42 Stat. 227,241-42. Three years later the provision was amended, pro-
viding that taxation would be deferred rather than permanently forgiven, for qualifying tax-
payers. See RevenueAct of 1924, ch. 234, § 203,43 Stat. 253, 256-57. See generally Dettmers
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 430 F.2d 1019, 1022 (6th Cir. 1970).
99. See I.R.C. § 1033 (1994). The "conversion" occurs typically when the taxpayer
receives insurance proceeds or a condemnation award as compensation for lost property. See
generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don't NeedAnother Hero, 60 S. CAL.L.
REv. 397 (1987). The "like-kind exchange" provision of I.R.C. § 1031, originally enacted in
1921, was also an antecedent of the rollover rule of § 1034.
100. See supra Part I.B.
101. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
102. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 18, 16.02, at 304-05 (citing C. Blum, Rollover: An
Alternative Treatment of Capital Gains, 41 TAX L. REV. 383 (1986)).
103. See H.R. REP.No. 82-586, at 27(1951), reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1781,1808;
infra Part IV.C.
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creating the potential for great harm to the natural environment. 1 At the same
time, the buy-up requirement produced no significant countervailing benefit
to the national fisc. In actual operation, most home sellers enjoy something
akin to a permanent exclusion of gain from taxable income, °5 with only 4% of
home sales generating tax revenues for the federal treasury. " The legislative
history of the Revenue Act of 1951 "0 provides no definitive explanation why
Congress linked tax relief for home sellers to the price of the replacement
home. Although the Act generated some four hundred pages of legislative
history,"0 8 the home sale preference evoked a scant nine pages of consid-
eration,"' and the rollover rule was the subject of virtually no congressional
debate."0 Despite the silence of the legislative record, one can make certain
inferences of congressional intent by referring back to the Revenue Act of
1921,"' under which Congress enacted the first capital gains preferences.
B. Converting the Involuntary Conversion Provision
The sparse legislative history of § 1034, as well as its text, suggest that it
was patterned after the involuntary conversion provision of § 1033. First
enacted in 1921, the precursor to § 1033 provided tax relief to those who had
sufferedan "involuntaryconversion" ofcapital assets into cashproceeds. 112 Con-
gress had enacted the provision in response to the government requisition or
condemnation of ships during World War I. 1' If ship owners were taxed on the
resultant "gain" -the difference between the government condemnation award
and the original purchase price - they would not have sufficient funds with
which to purchase replacement ships. In a letter to the Ways and Means Coin-
104. See infra Part VII.B.
105. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
106. Education Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Donald C. Lubick).
107. Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183, § 318, 65 Stat. 452, 494.
108. SeeH.R. CoNF.REP.NO. 82-1179(1951),reprintedin 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2121,2121-
2170; S. REP.No. 82-781 (195 1),reprintedin 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1969, 1969-2098; H.R.REP.
No. 82-586 (195 1),reprintedin 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1781,1781-1942. Ifoneincludestranscripts
of congressional debate in the legislative history, then the record is even more voluminous.
109. SeeS.REP.NO. 82-781, pt. 1 at34-37, reprintedin 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1969,2004-06;
H.R. REP.No. 82-586, at27-29, reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1781, 1808-10; 97 CoNG.REc.
11603 (1951) (statement of Sen. George), reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2099,2118-19; 97
CONG. REc. 6891 (1951) (statement of Rep. Doughton), reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943,
1947.
110. See generally 97 CONG. REc. 6889-98, 11,597-12,383 (1951).
111. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227.
112. See generally Filippini v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd, 318
F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1963).
113. See American Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 279 F.2d 220,225-26 (Ct. Cl.) (citing
in part letter from Secretary of the Treasury to Committee on Ways and Means).
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mittee, the Secretary ofthe Treasury describedthe hardship created bythetaxa-
tion of gains resulting from such forced sales.1 4 The Secretary concludedthat,
[t]o require the taxpayer to pay income and war profits and excess profits
taxes upon the difference between the cost... and the compensation
received at the time of requisition or loss would have been to take such a
large proportion of the amount received for the vessel that, although the
owner desired to replace the same, the taking of the tax by the Government
would have made it impossible in practically every instance."'
Thirty years later, Congress was well aware of the involuntary conversion
provision as it drafted the new home sale preference. Representative Forand,
a Rhode Island Democrat and member of the Ways and Means Committee,
introducedthe home sale preference. 6 The Congressmanjustified his commit-
tee's proposal as hardship relief, necessitated in large part by the national
defense crisis." 7 The exigencies of war permeated the analysis, suggesting
that taxpayer moves were prompted by the labor needs of the World War II
and post-World War II defense industry rather than by personal choice."'
Congressman Forand emphasized two points in support of the provision.
First, he argued that many home sales were "involuntary" -Americans moved
from one city to another to satisfy the labor needs of the defense industry." 9
In fact, he compared home sales to involuntary conversions. In support of this
analogy, he discussed a hypothetical Mr. Smith who worked for the govern-
ment in Washington for thirty years until he "was ordered" to move to Chi-
cago. 2 In arguing that it was unfair to tax the capital gain resulting from the
sale of Mr. Smith's home in Washington, the Congressman concluded that
"[i]n practical fact, although not technically under the law, Mr. Smith had an
involuntary conversion. '
Second, Congressman Forand emphasized the lack of a subjective profit
motive.'" That is, home owners generally sell their property out of necessity,
rather than out of a desire to generate a profit." The congressman stated,
114. Id. at226.
115. Id.
116. 97 CONG. REc. 6960 (1951) (statement of Rep. Forand).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., H.R. REP.No. 82-586, at 27 (1951), reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1781,
1808 (stating that involuntary moves are "particularly numerous in periods ofrapid change such
as mobilization or reconversion").
119. 97 CONG. REc. 6960 (1951) (statement of Rep. Forand).
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"Gains resulting from switches of personal residences are... not in the same
category as gains from the sale of other capital assets since they are ordinarily
not obtained as a result of a desire to make profit in the usual sense of the
word."
1 24
The statutory text of § 1033 and § 1034 further supports the inference
that the rollover rule was adapted from the involuntary conversion provision.
Both provide for the deferral of gain, but only to the extent that the taxpayer
replaces the original property or home with an equally expensive substitute.
At the time of the 1951 legislative debate, the involuntary conversion provi-
sion provided:
Involuntary Conversion. Ifproperty (as a result of its destruction in whole
or in part, theft or seizure, or an exercise of the power of requisition or
condemnation, or the threat or imminence thereof) is compulsorily or
involuntarily converted into property similar or related in service or use to
the property so converted, or into money which is forthwith in good
faith.., expended in the acquisition of other property similar or related in
service or use to the property so converted .... no gain shall be recognized,
but loss shall be recognized. If any part of the money is not so expended,
the gain, if any, shall be recognized, to the extent of the money which is not
so expended'25
Thirty years after the enactment of the involuntary conversion provision,
Congress revisited the same issue: how to provide relief from the capital
gains tax when wartime circumstances resulted in the forced liquidation of
assets. Congress's 1951 response, the rollover rule, relied heavily upon the
earlier legislation:
[G]ain (if any) from such [home] sale shall be recognized only to the extent
that the taxpayer's selling price of the old residence exceeds the taxpayer's
cost of purchasing the new residence....
The justifiability of such an adaptation depends upon whether homes and
ships are functionally equivalent as capital assets.
C. A Case of Mistaken Identity: Is a Home Like a Ship?
Although convenient, the analogy between ship condemnations and home
sales proves inapt. Admittedly, there is at least a superficial similarity be-
124. Id.
125. I.R.C. §112(f) (1939) (emphasis added).
126. Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183, § 318, 65 Stat. 452, 494; see also 97
CONG. REc. 6961 (1951). As an additional rationale supporting the deferral of the capital gains
tax, Congressman Forand noted that capital losses from home sales were not deductible from
net income, even though losses from the sale of other capital assets were deductible "against
capital gains or against ordinary income." Id. He suggested that this anomaly was inequitable
and should be corrected. Id.
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tween the two provisions. Both involve transactions that generally are not
profit-driven, and both provide a sympathetic case in which taxation seems to
impose an unfair hardship upon the property owner. In both cases, Congress
claimed that certain sales or exchanges of assets should not be recognized as
taxable events if the status quo were restored within a reasonable time and the
investment continued. One important difference overshadows these similari-
ties: Ships are movable, whereas homes are fixed in a specific geographic
location. As a result, ship owners can search a national market for replace-
ment property. In contrast, family or work constraints generally confine home
shoppers to a particular region.
Why does this difference matter? The answer turns upon the identifica-
tion of those who are deserving of tax relief.'27 If Congress wanted to single
out involuntary transactions for special relief, then continuity of investment
might be a useful surrogate for the measurement of merit. That is, if taxpayers
expeditiously replace their lost assets, then perhaps we can assume that they
never freely parted with those assets in the first instance. But, how should we
measure continuity of investment? Should we require that assets be replaced
with property of similar kind or similar cost? By applying the latter test to
both homes and ships, Congress failed to recognize the difference between
movable and immovable property. In the case of home sales, the rollover
rule's cost-based analysis may be a clumsy test for identifying those involun-
tary sellers who are entitled to tax relief.
For example, suppose that Y owned a modest two bedroom, one bath,
1000 square foot home in Honolulu, Hawaii. Yhad purchased the home in
1950 for $150,000, but it had appreciated in value to $350,000."2 Assume
also that an accident seriously injured Y's adult child. Yreluctantly sells the
Hawaii home to care for the child in Des Moines, Iowa, where the median
home price was $50,000.19 If Ybuys a two bedroom, one bath, 1000 square
foot home in Des Moines for $50,000, does Ydeserve the protection of the
home sale preference? If we take Congress at its word, 30 then Ywould seem
to be a deserving candidate for tax relief. After all, the sale of Y's home was
not truly voluntary, nor was it prompted by a profit-motive. On the other hand
Yclearly does not qualify for rollover treatment under § 1034 even though Y
replaced the Hawaii home with a virtually identical property in Iowa.
127. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing Americans' complex atti-
tudes about wealth and taxation).
128. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., COUNTY AND CITY DATA
BOOK 716 (12th ed. 1994) (stating that in 1990 median value of homes in Honolulu was
$353,900).
129. Id. at 740 (stating that in 1990 median value of homes in Des Moines was $49,500).
130. The home sale preference was introduced as a measure to prevent hardship to those
who sold their homes unwillingly and without profit-motivation. See supra Part III.B.
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Suppose instead that Y parted involuntarily with a ship, rather than a
home. Assume that Y's ship had been destroyed by a submarine during World
War I. Yhad purchased the ship for $150,000, but it was worth $350,000
at the time of its destruction. 2 In compensation for the loss, Y received a
check for $350,000.3 Ysearched throughout the country for a similar ship,
and purchased a replacement for $350,000. 31 In this case, Yis clearly entitled
to tax relief' 35 Not only has Yreplaced the lost ship with virtually identical
property, but Yhas expended the full $350,000 in so doing.3 6 Thus, Yde-
serves relief under both the replacement-in-kind and replacement-cost tests of
merit.
37
Why does the rollover rule appear to be an adequate test of merit for the
conversion of ships, but not homes? Two explanations are possible. First,
perhaps the rule is adequate in both cases. If there is a potential discontinuity
between articulated legislative purpose and the statutory mechanism chosen
to implement that purpose, then one could argue that the latter should prevail.
Thus, we might conclude - despite legislative pronouncements to the con-
trary - that the purpose of the home sale preference was simply to reward
those who buy up, without regard to hardship or subjective motivation.
Alternatively, we might conclude that the rollover rule is not adequate in the
context of the home sale preference because it encourages overspending
beyond that necessary to replace the original home. Through its repeal of the
rollover rule in 1997, Congress implicitly endorsed the second explanation. 38
IV The Revenue Act of 1951
As discussed in the previous Part, there was a poor fit between the
rollover rule and the goals of the home sale preference. The rule was at cross-
purposes with the preference, measuring the subjective motivation of the
seller (involuntary sale lacking a profit motive) with an objective ruler (cost
of new residence). Why did Congress do such a poor job of providing the
desired relief? The political context against which Congress enacted the
preference provides a partial explanation for the apparent lapse in reason.
131. See Hearings Before the Comm. on Finance, U.S. Senate, 67th Cong. 55 (1921)








138. See infra Part VIII.B.
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Congress acted against a unique political backdrop, poised between the
eras of traditional war and cold war. The post-war mood of the 1951 Con-
gress suggests three reasons why the predecessor to § 1034 may have received
inadequate legislative scrutiny and attention to detail. First, the home sale
preference was subsumed in the larger debate of how to balance a federal
budget burdened by past war debts while simultaneously preparing for the
uncertain defense needs of the new cold-war era. As a result, Congress was
concerned more with protecting federal revenues than providing tax relief.
Second, the preference garnered a surprising, widespread support in the midst
of an otherwise hostile debate. In 1951, the dream of home ownership finally
appeared within the reach of many Americans.'39 Due to its broad appeal, the
preference may have passed too easily, without the checks and balances
inherent in vigorous bipartisan debate.1 40 Third, the ubiquitous political
grandstanding common to every era may have prompted legislators to articu-
late noble policies incapable of realization. The promise to protect the seller
who is pure of heart (untainted by profit-seeking) was reduced, perhaps
inevitably, to the mathematical precision of the rollover rule.
A. War and Taxes
One can best understand the Revenue Act of 1951141 in the context of the
historical relationship between war and taxes. By mid-century, Congress had
firmly established the pattern of raising war revenues through increases in the
federal income tax. 42 Prior to World War I, the federal income tax was of
relatively minor importance to the national treasury, providing less than 10%
of federal funds.1 43 The financial needs of the war, however, provided the
impetus for a significant increase in the income tax.'" During the period 1913
139. A Census Bureau publication states that "[o]wning one's home has long been
considered apart of the American Dream." HOMEOWNERSHIP, supra note 37. The article notes
that "The post-World War II surge was remarkable. A booming economy, favorable tax laws,
a rejuvenated home building industry, and easier financing saw homeownership explode
nationally, topping 60 percent in just two decades." Id.
140. The home seller preference continues to generate bipartisan support. During the 1996
presidential campaign, both candidates endorsed an expanded tax break for home sales. See
Passell, supra note 37, at 33 ("[B]roadening the capital gains exemption [for home sales is] a
deficit-conscious Presidential candidate's dream. Here, after all, is a tax break with great
popular appeal that requires only modest offsetting revenues.").
141. Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183, 65 Stat. 452.
142. JOHN F. WrrrE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 79
(1985) (describing war periods as "the single most important influence on the formation and
structure of the [income and general] tax code").
143. Id. Excise and customs taxes provided the remaining 90% of federal revenues. Id.
144. The moderm income tax was not adopted until 1913, after the passage of the Sixteenth
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to 1915, the highest marginal tax rate on individual income was 7%. 145 By
1918, marginal rates had increased more than tenfold, to a maximum of
77%.146 As a result, the tax generated almost 60% of federal revenues.
1 47
Thus, the income tax had been discovered as a bountiful source of revenue to
finance the war effort.
During World War II, Congress again raised taxes to support the military
budget. By 1944, the maximum marginal rate on individual income had
reached a staggering 94%. 148 In addition, Congress broadened the tax base to
include a greater percentage of Americans. 49 In the decade before the war,
fewer than 5% of Americans were required to pay income tax. 5 Between
1940 and 1945, however, the income tax burden spread from approximately
7 million to 42 million Americans. '5
In sum, both world wars enjoyed considerable popular and congressional
support, with concomitant increases in the rate of taxation. 52 But even during
those relatively popular wars, congressional willingness to accommodate
executive budget requests was short-lived. One tax historian explains:
In considering the financing of the major wars in this century, Congress
began in each case with quick, decisive, and bipartisan action, granting
most of what the president requested. As the wars progressed, however,
revenue increases became much more controversial, and Congress strongly
asserted itself in rewriting administrative proposals.... What this progres-
sion demonstrates is that only in those early months of almost hysterical
reaction to crisis can revenues easily be raised in the United States. At all
other times, gains will be traded only for losses granted elsewhere in the
Amendment resolved constitutional issues. Id. at 75-78.
145. The surtax ranged from 1% (on taxable income up to $20,000) to 7% (on taxable
income over $500,000). JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 243 (1987). In addition,
a modest "normal tax" was also imposed upon individual income. JACOB MERTENS, LAW OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 2.02 (1989).
146. The tax ranged from 6% (on taxable income up to $4000) to 77% (on taxable income
over $1,000,000). PECHMAN, supra note 145, at 243.
147. WIT=E, supra note 142.
148. Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-315, §§ 3,4(a), 58 Stat. 231,231-
32 (establishing marginal rates that ranged from 22% of income over $2000 to 91% of income
over $200,000); see PECHMAN, supra note 145, at 301 (stating maximum marginal rate reached
94% during World War II).
149. Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role ofPropaganda in the Expansion
of the Income Tax During World War 11, 37 BuFF. L. REv. 685, 685 (1989).
150. Id. (citing LAWRENCE H. SELTZER, THE PERSONAL EXEMPTIONS IN THE INCOME TAX
62 (1968)).
151. Jones, supra note 149, at 686 (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSuS, U.S. DEP'TOF COM.,
SER. No. Y 402-411, HIsTORICAL STATISTICS OF AMERICA 1110 (1975)).
152. WITE, supra note 142, at 83.
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code, and the trading seems to continue to the point where no one is satis-
fied but few can afford to see the bill defeated.'
In 1951, President Truman faced two obstacles as he submitted his cold-
war budget to Congress. First, the current "war" in Korea was of a new kind,
one unlikely to trigger widespread public fervor. Second, the war-induced
momentum in support of tax increases - if it had ever existed - had dissipated
long before the passage of the Revenue Act of 1951.
B. From Hot War to Cold War
Congressional discomfort with the emerging cold war contributed to the
bitter tone of the 1951 debate. On June 25, 1950, North Korea invaded South
Korea."' Four days later, after communist troops reached Seoul, President
Truman sent U.S. forces to defend the southern republic. 55 Based upon the
nation's past experience, one might expect that Congress would willingly
increase taxes to support the President's military expenditures. In fact, such
a spirit of cooperation did exist, but only for a limited period of time prior to
the debate over the 1951 Act. On September 23, 1950, Congress increased
revenues by $6.1 billion, and on January 3, 1951, Congress provided for an
additional $3.9 billion revenue increase.
56
The bipartisan momentum had dissipated by the time President Truman
submitted his annual budget to Congress on January 15, 1951 .' The pro-
jected defense expenditures for 1952 were $41 billion - more than twice the
amount spent for defense in 1951 158 The prevailing antideficit philosophy
was "pay as you go." ' Accordingly, Truman's budget sought to raise $10
billion in new federal revenues from a variety of sources, including a $4
billion increase in the personal income tax. 61 Congress criticized the Presi-
153. Id. at 143-44.
154. 3 CoUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONs, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS 30
(Bruce W. Jentleson & Thomas G. Paterson eds., 1997). After World War II, Korea had been
divided informally along the 38th parallel, with the northern portion under the administration
of the Soviet Union and the southern portion under the administration of the United States. Id.
at 25. Following elections sponsored by the United Nations in southern Korea, the Republic
of Korea (ROK) was formed on August 15, 1948. Id. The Soviet Union responded by sup-
porting the formation of the communist Democratic People's Republic ofKorea in the north. Id.
155. Id. at31.
156. See S. REP.No. 82-781, at 1 (1951), reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1969, 1969; see
also WITTE, supra note 142, at 137-41 (describing how Finance Committee acted "quickly in
the bipartisan spirit typical of previous early wartime legislation").
157. See 97 CONG. REc. 11,721-22(1951); 97 CONG. REC. 6956(1951).
158. WrrrE, supra note 142, at 140.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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dent's budget as excessive, and the battle over the 1951 Act was protracted
and bitter.
What caused Congress to abandon its historical attitude of wartime coop-
eration with the executive branch? Several factors may help to explain this
failure to support the Korean war effort enthusiastically. First, the President
had ordered U.S. troops to Korea without a declaration of war by Congress. 6'
A Congress that had not been part of the decision to engage in war might be
disinclined to authorize funding for such a war. As one historical account
noted wryly, "Truman saw little need to consult Congress - except when he
wanted the $69.5 billion Korean War bill paid.'
62
Second, the United States had not developed clear foreign policy goals
with respect to Korea. The United States had a long history of ambivalence
toward the Korean peninsula, approving Japanese control over the peninsula
from 1905 to 1940.163 When World War II ended nearly a half-century of
Japanese domination, the United States suddenly found itself responsible for
the administration of South Korea."6 The United States was a reluctant
protector at best. 65 Only six months before the outbreak of hostilities in
Korea, for example, the Secretary of State had declared that South Korea was
not within the U.S. defense perimeter. 66 Thus, Congress may not have been
willing to increase taxes to protect a nation that had traditionally been consid-
ered peripheral to the United States' security interests.
An examination of domestic politics supplies a third explanation of why
the 1951 tax debates were polarized rather than cooperative. The Democratic
party had held the presidency for nearly two decades. 67 By mid-century, the
161. See Louis Fisher, The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?, 89 AM.
J. INT'L L. 21, 21 (1995); 3 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 154, at 32; see also
JOHN W. SPANIER, THE TRUMAN-MAcARTHUR CONTROVERsY AND THE KOREAN WAR 44-48,
58-64 (1965).
162. 3 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 154, at 32.
163. Through the Taft-Katsura Agreement of 1905, the United States acknowledged Japa-
nese domination over Korea in exchange for Japanese recognition of the American presence in
the Philippines. Id. at 24.
164. After World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to a division of
the peninsula, with the United States occupying the territory south of the 38th parallel and the
Soviets occupying the area north ofthat parallel. See ROBERTJ. DONOvAN,NEMESIS,TRUMAN
AND JOHNSON IN THE COILS OF WAR IN ASIA 15-16 (1984).
165. See 3 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 154, at25 ("In the early postwar
years the United States's policy toward Korea ... was half-hearted. Washington's main
purpose was to shed the responsibilities for Korea it inherited as a consequence of victory over
Japan.").
166. Id.
167. Franklin D. Roosevelt held the presidency for twelve years before Truman took office
in 1945. See I COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 154, at 277.
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Republicans were eager to recapture the office. As one newspaper editorial
stated in late 1949, there was a "rising revolt" in the Republican party that
could have led to "junking the bipartisan foreign policy in the hope that some
partisan advantage could be salvaged from the resulting discord."'68 The
debate over the 1951 Revenue Act illustrates the disintegration of bipartisan-
ship, with the Republicans accusing the Democratic administration ofpromot-
ing taxing and spending policies that were not in the best interests of the
nation.
Finally - and perhaps most importantly - the fundamental nature of war
changed as the "cold war" era began.'69 Typical of the new breed of conflict,
the Korean War was a frustrating experience for the United States. Unlike
World War II, there was no decisive military victory but simply a containment
of Soviet communist influence to the northern portion of the Korean penin-
sula.17 There was no formal end to the war because South Korea never
signed the truce agreement.1 ' Indeed, there was not even a clear acknowledg-
ment that the United States had been at "war," for President Truman insisted
that the conflict was simply a "police action."'"
Taken together, these factors set the stage for a protracted budget battle
between the political parties. Republicans and Democrats were locked in a
deadly embrace because both shared the "pay-as-you-go" philosophy. 173 As
a result, both were determined to balance the federal budget by offsetting
federal expenditures with federal tax revenues.174 The parties disagreed, how-
ever, about how to structure that balance. In particular, the issue of how to
treat capital gains was a divisive topic, cast primarily in terms of rich against
poor.
175
168. SPANIERsupra note 161, at 44-45 (quoting uncited 1949 Washington Star editorial).
169. See I COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 154, at 273.
170. 3 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 154, at 32.
171. Although a truce was declared on July 27, 1953, South Korea never signed the
agreement Id. at 26.
172. See Fisher, supra note 161, at33-34.
173. Wr=r, supra note 142, at 140.
174. For example, one Senator stated:
Inflation is our greatest danger.... For the first time in the history of the United
States the Federal debt exceeded the national income in a single year in 1942.
Until 1942, when we were in the middle of World War II, the national income of
all the people of the United States far exceeded the national debt.... [T]hrough
all the wars of this country, through all its crises, even through the great depression
of 1929, our national income was far greater than our national debt.
97 CoNG. REc. 11,830 (1951) (statement of Sen. O'Mahoney).
175. Id. at 11,723 (statement of Sen. Humphrey) ("It would violate every test of equal
sacrifice to ask the man in the street to pay higher excise and income taxes when the rich
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The Republican minority asserted that the budget should be balanced by
reducing expenditures, not by increasing taxes. The Republicans reacted
strongly against President Truman's budget requests and claimed that his
proposed expenditures were excessive. 76 Republican congressmen claimed
that they were "stunned"'77 by the President's "spending orgy""17 that would
propel the nation into socialism and "a most dangerous situation" of infla-
tion.'79 Using terminology that is still popular today, the Republicans criti-
cized the President's "tax and spend" philosophy.80 In particular, the minor-
ity representatives argued that the President's excessive tax increases would
unduly penalize wealthy' and corporate'82 taxpayers. The Republicans
opposed any increase in the rate of capital gains taxation, claiming that an
increase would deter capital investments and ultimately would reduce federal
revenues. 183
become richer through our failure to close loopholes.").
176. One Republican congressman stated that he was "stunned by the size of President
Truman's budget for 1952," under which proposed federal spending for 1952 exceeded "the
total Federal spending for any 10 successive years added together in the history of our Nation
up to the beginning of the fiscal year 1942." Id. at 6956 (statement of Rep. Martin); see also
id. at 6956 (statement of Rep. Simpson) ("We have scraped the bottom of the tax barrel...
[and] are now in the wood.").
177. Id. at 6956 (statement of Rep. Martin).
178. Id. at 6957 (statement of Rep. Martin) ("High taxes cannot offset the inflationary
impact of such a governmental spending orgy as we have witnessed during the past 20 years.");
see also id. at 6952 (statement of Rep. Simpson) (complaining that "the job of balancing the
budget is an almost impossible job when those in charge of spending are on a spending spree"
and that "if this administration is given a dollar it will spend a dollar and twenty cents or more").
179. Id. at 6952 (statement of Rep. Simpson); see also id. at 6952 (statement of Rep.
Fulton) (complaining that increased taxes will "cut down the incentive to hustle, to work, and
to produce, which is inflationary").
180. Id. at 6954 (statement of Rep. Simpson) ("But the thing I am worried about is the fact
the more we tax the more they are going to continue to spend and I say we cannot continue
indefinitely doing that.").
181. Id. at 6953 (statement of Rep. Simpson) (complaining that past "soak-the-rich" tax
policies have "wiped out that group of taxpayers who have in the past been paying a large share
of our tax burden").
182. Id. (statement of Rep. Simpson) (favoring special corporate tax concessions because
"our tax laws so penalize our corporations that they do not have the money with which to
expand" and asserting that business must expand "if the industrial might of America is to help
us win this war in Korea").
183. Id. at 11,722 (statement of Sen. Millikin) ("If [we] want to get revenue out of capital
gains, the way to get it is to ... decrease the rate."); id. at 11,722-23 (statement of Sen.
Millikin). Senator Milliken noted:
If [we] were to lengthen the time and increase the rate, and thus sterilize the
movement of capital... [we] would not be helping the income base with greater
income, and thus we would not be collecting any more income taxes.... [T]he
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In response, the Democrats favored balancing the budget by raising
the tax on income generally and on capital gains in particular. They labeled
their Republican counterparts "calamity howlers" and "gloomy Jeremiahs
scream[ing] socialism."'" In a poignant appeal, one congressman argued that
willingness to sacrifice and pay higher taxes was necessary to preserve
democracy for centuries to come:
This Nation and all free nations are now engaged in another struggle, a
struggle not merely of arnies but of ideologies, a struggle, the outcome of
which may determine for centuries to come whether freemen shall live in
peace under free governments of their own choosing.... And although
heavy taxes are necessary, the sacrifices we shall have to make to pay them
is small indeed compared to the sacrifices made by the youth of our Nation
who defend us. Let us have faith in our country, faith in our people, and
do our simple duty. 8 '
The Democrats supported an increase in the maximum capital gain tax rate
from 25% to 37.5%.86 They contended that capital gain preferences were
nothing more than "class legislation" favoring the wealthy at the expense of
progressive taxation. 87 One Senator noted that increasing the rate differential
between capital gains and ordinary income through preferences for the former
would encourage circumvention of the tax code. The senator compared this
transformation of earned income into capital gain to the efforts of feudal
alchemists to transform base metals into gold. 88 In addition, the Democrats
lower the rate and the shorter the period of time, the greater the amount of capital
transactions, and therefore the greater the amount of capital gains will be.
Id. (statement of Sen. Millikin).
184. 1d. at 6955-56 (statement of Rep. Combs).
185. Id. (statement of Rep. Combs).
186. See, e.g., id. at 11,720-21 (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (supporting increase in
maximum capital gains tax from 25% to 37.5% and asking why Finance Committee did not
"believe in increasing tax burdens of recipients of capital gains, even in the slightest degree, as
the burdens on wages and other incomes are increased").
187. 1d. (statement ofSen. Humphrey). Senator Humphrey claimed that capital gains rates
must be raised to keep pace with the increases in other income taxes "to protect the basic equity
of the individual income tax." Id. At the time, there was a fragile consensus that the federal
tax system should be progressive, imposing a proportionately greater burden upon those with
greater incomes. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate
Structure: A New Lookat Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1905 (1987); Walter J. Blum
& Harry Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952);
Edwin S. Cohen, Reflections on the US. Progressive Income Tax: Its Past and Present, 62 VA.
L. REV. 1317 (1976).
188. 97 CONG. REc. 11,720 (1951) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
[A]fter four hundred or five hundred years of fruitless searching on the part of the
scientists of those days, they never did convert base metal into gold. We had to
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feared that capital gain preferences would erode the tax base and reduce
federal revenues generally.8 9
The mood of Congress in 1951 was, therefore, highly contentious. Con-
sensus on any tax reform measure appeared unlikely. In particular, one could
not have predicted that the home sale provision could survive the Democratic
hostility toward capital gain preferences. Nevertheless, the preference tran-
scended economic and political lines and attracted bipartisan support.
C. A Bipartisan Oasis: The Home Sale Preference
The House debated the 1951 Act for almost two days before turning
the discussion to the home sale preference. The proposal received broad
support from both Democratic and Republican legislators.' 9 In fact, not a
single Congressman spoke out against the provision in the published floor
debates.
What political factors could account for this oasis of bipartisan agree-
ment within an otherwise hostile deliberation? Why would Congress agree
to a tax relief measure in a bill whose purpose was primarily to raise federal
revenues? Particularly surprising was the fact that the home sale provision
had been drafted at the initiative of the Democrats.'9 ' After all, they had
argued strenuously against expanding the general preference for capital gains,
claiming that such tax breaks were simply "class legislation" that relieved the
wealthy of the obligation to pay their fair share of the national tax burden.' 92
The Democrats attempted to explain this apparent inconsistency by identifying
the expected beneficiaries of the proposal. As he introduced the provision,
Representative Forand'93 entered two tables into the record which he pur-
ported would demonstrate that the personal residence provision would particu-
larly assist low-income taxpayers.' 94 His data suggested that a large majority
wait for the modem tax lawyer to do that.... He has an ever-increasing productive
program of how to convert earned income [always taxed at higher rates] into capital
gains.
Id.
189. Senator Humphrey argued, "[I]f we keep whacking away at this ordinary income
base, even though we have high rates, we will find that we shall have nothing to draw from,
because ordinary income is being converted into capital gains, which are being given the
preferential type of treatment." Id. at 11,721.
190. In the House of Representatives, Congressmen Simpson and Mills spoke in favor of
the provision. Id. at 6952-56. In the Senate, Republican Long spoke in favor of the bill. Id.
at 11,721.
191. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
194. 97 CONG. REc. 6961-62 (1951).
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of home owners in the United States were of low income.195 Thus, the Demo-
crats could join the Republicans in supporting a capital gain preference with-
out abandoning their nonwealthy constituents. The Republicans also wel-
comed the home sale provision as legislation that would promote the interests
of their party. The special deferral of taxation of the gain resulting from home
sales was consistent with their support of the capital gains preference in
general.'96 At the same time, wealthy home sellers would certainly benefit
from the provision along with their poorer counterparts.
An even more basic explanation can account for this bipartisan agree-
ment: The home sale provision may have provided relief to weary congress-
men as well as to arguably over-taxed home owners. That is, after the rancor-
ous debate over other provisions of the 1951 Act, the legislators may have
embraced this opportunity for congenial consensus.197 Furthermore, the cost
was relatively minor. Compared to the President's proposal to generate over
four billion dollars in new revenues through increased taxation, 98 the personal
residence provision was projected to result in a revenue loss of only $112
million. 99
V The Unintended Consequences of the Rollover Rule:
Three Hypotheses
As discussed in the previous Part, Congress failed to analyze carefully or
to debate thoroughly the purpose of the rollover rule."°° Instead, the legisla-
tors simply assumed that the limited home sale preference would provide
hardship relief to otherwise over-taxed home owners. It would not be surpris-
ing, therefore, if over time the actual effects of the rule deviated substantially
from those anticipated by Congress in 1951. In particular, § 1034 may have
relieved one type of hardship, but only by placing several new burdens upon
the taxpayer and the landscape. These potential, unexpected consequences
include: (1) over-investment in housing, (2) inflated housing prices in certain
geographic areas, and (3) the conversion of farmland into suburban housing
developments.
Part V examines the expected behavior of "rational taxpayers," those
whose housing choices are influenced by a desire to maximize their economic
195. Representative Forand stated that in 1949, buyers with incomes below $5000
accounted for 71% of all home purchases (excluding farms). Id.
196. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
197. When the homesaleprovision wasintroduced intheHouse, themood changed abruptly
from one of mud-slinging to one of congenial back-slapping. See 97 CONG. REc. 6961 (1951).
198. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
199. 97 CONG. REc. 6962 (statement of Rep. Forand).
200. See supra Part IV.
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well-being. This Part describes how the buy-up requirement of the rollover
rule may have influenced their behavior, unintentionally leading to the three
results outlined above. Part VI moves from the realm of the hypothetical to
the actual by presenting data on the sale of homes in Santa Clara County,
California, and on the purchase of homes in Boulder County, Colorado.
Through the case studies, numerous individual choices coalesce into a broader
pattern of the collective. The goals of Parts V and VI are quite modest. They
do not purport to prove that the rollover rule caused specific effects. Rather,
they simply describe three potential, unanticipated consequences of the rule
and present data that are consistent with those hypotheses.
A. Over-Investment in Housing
The rollover rule may have distorted the choice of home buyers, creating
a strong incentive for over-investment in housing. Profit from the sale of a
home - like any other capital asset - is taxed as capital gain in the absence of
special relief provisions. For over seventy-five years, the Code has offered
various preferences for capital gains in general, in part to assuage the fear that
excessive taxation might lock capital into undesirable investments.2"'
However, the generalized preference for capital gains has not provided
adequate protection for home sellers. The family home differs in significant
respects from other capital assets. Many view the home primarily as shelter
and sanctuary rather than as a profit-making investment. Taxing home sales,
therefore, has an aura of unfairness, particularly when the tax burden forces
home sellers to "trade down" on each successive move into less desirable
living quarters. Congress enacted the rollover rule in 1951 in an effort to
relieve this perceived hardship.0 2
The rule, which remained in effect until 1997,203 provided only a partial
cure for the home seller's financial woes. Congress could have excluded all
gains on personal residences from income. Instead it simply deferred taxation
201. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. For a recent articulation of the "lock-in"
argument in the context of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, see 143 CONG. REC. S6397-98
(daily ed. June 26, 1997) (statement of Sen. Roth).
We are trying to free up hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars to the best
investment available to help ensure that we are creating in this country an environ-
ment of growth, jobs, and opportunity... [and] in this competitive world of today
and in this global economy, it is critically important that we [encourage more
investment and] make the best utilization of the capital we have so that we are in
a strong competitive position.
Id.
202. See supra Part IV.C.
203. See infra Part VIII.B.
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for home owners who continued to purchase ever more expensive homes. 4
With such a tempting option, the rational taxpayei would continue to buy up.
In fact, taxpayers did exhibit this rational behavior, with only 4% of all home
sales resulting in a taxed gain.2 5 This tax benefit was not without its costs,
however. The rule encouraged people to buy more expensive homes than they
needed or wanted, particularly when they moved from high-cost regions to
low-cost areas. The rule may also have discouraged home sellers from
moving into less expensive quarters and transferring a portion of their assets
into higher-yield investments.0 6 Finally, those who encountered financial
difficulties would incur a substantial tax penalty if they sold their homes
because they needed cash for urgent expenditures.0 7 The net result of this
compliance with the rollover rule may be a national over-investment in
housing, locking investments into the housing market.2 '
How - if at all - did the rollover rule influence the housing choices of
taxpayers? Consider the example of X, a taxpayer who sold a principal
residence in Boston in order to take a new job in another city. Xpurchased
the home twenty years ago for $100,000 and sold it in 1994 for an adjusted
sales price of $150,000.209 The home was an ideal size to accommodate X's
family comfortably, andXwanted to buy or rent a similar residence in the new
city. Suppose X's new job was in San Francisco, where the cost of housing
was generally higher than that of Boston."l' While shopping for a new home,
204. See supra Part III.A.
205. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
206. During the last two decades, the stock market has outperformed the real estate market.
Funds invested in the stock market increased an average of 400% during that period of time,
while assets invested in the real estate market increased at a rate less than that of inflation. FY
98 Budget: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. (1997)
(statement of Richard Woodbury, National Assoc. of Realtors), available in 1997 WL 8220306.
207. For many Americans, the home represents the family's most valuable asset, account-
ing for approximately one-fifth of individuals' total net worth. Jerome Kurtz, The Interest
Deduction Under OurHybrid TaxSystem: Muddling TowardAccommodation, 50 TAXL. REV.
153, 188 (1995) (citing BOARD OF GOVERNORS OFTHE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, BALANCE
SHEETS FORTHEU.S. ECONOMY 1945-1992, at 25 (1993)); see also Erik M. Jensen, BookNote,
47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 253,256 n.17 (1996) ("The largest asset for a majority of American
families is home equity.") (citing Michael J. Boskin, A Frameworkfor the Tax Reform Debate,
in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 11, 24 (Michael J. Boskin ed. 1996)).
208. At the end of 1992, the value of all owner-occupied housing in the United States was
$6,671.1 billion. Kurtz, supra note 207, at 188.
209. After subtracting various expenses for work performed on the old residence in order
to prepare it for sale, Xhas realized $150,000 from the transaction. Using the terminology of
§ 1034, $150,000 represents the adjusted sales price ofX's home. See I.R.C. § 1034(b) (1994)
(repealed 1997) (defining adjusted sales price).
210. The 1990 median value of Boston homes was $161,400. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
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Xrealized that the $150,000 proceeds from the sale of the old home would not
go very far in the San Francisco housing market. In fact, that sum was suffi-
cient to purchase only a smaller home of inferior quality in a less attractive
neighborhood. What were X's options? Ignoring tax consequences, Xmight
have chosen to rent an apartment, at least for a sufficient period of time during
which to accumulate savings toward the purchase of a more suitable home.
Under § 1034, however, Xwas forced to reinvest the $150,000 proceeds in a
new home within two years or be subject to a tax liability of up to $14,000.2"
When facing such a choice, Xmight well have decided to purchase a home in
San Francisco, even though at the time X could only afford a cramped and
inferior replacement of the Boston residence. In sum, Xwould have "over-
invested" in a home, even though renting would better have suited X's needs.
Now, suppose instead thatX's new job was in Albany, New York, where
housing was generally less expensive than in Boston.2"2 For $100,000, X
could purchase a home in Albany of similar size and quality to the former
residence in Boston. Again, ignoring tax consequences, Xmight have chosen
to purchase the $100,000 home. The remaining $50,000 from the Boston
proceeds could have been applied to any one of a number of saving or spend-
ing options, such as purchasing a new car, investing in the stock market,
financing the children's college education, or caring for elderly parents. Once
again, though, § 1034 guided X's decision. If X did not spend at least
$150,000 on a replacement residence, then Xwould owe tax on every dollar
of gain that X did not reinvest in a new home. Thus, if X purchased a home
in Albany for $100,000, Xwould have owed $14,000 in taxes on the remain-
ing $50,000,23 leaving X with $36,000 cash. Alternatively, X could have
spent at least $150,000 on a new home and paid no tax. In sum, Xcould have
converted the $150,000 Boston proceeds into either (1) a $100,000 home plus
$36,000 cash or (2) a $150,000 home. Under those circumstances, it is likely
that X would have spent at least $150,000 on a new home rather than give
$14,000 to the government in taxes. As a result, Xbought "more house" than
desirable simply to qualify for rollover treatment.
Every year, approximately four million homes are purchased in the
supra note 128, at 752. The 1990 median value of San Francisco homes was $298,900. lat at
692.
211. Capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than ordinary income. In the hypothetical, X
has realized a gain of $50,000 (the difference between the $100,000 Xpaid for the house and
the $150,000 X realized from the sale of the house). Under I.R.C. § 1(h) prior to 1997, long-
term capital gains were taxed at a maximum rate of 28%. See infra note 359 and accompanying
text. Therefore, the maximum capital gains tax imposed on the proceeds from X's sale of the
Boston home would be (.28) ($50,000) = $14,000.
212. The 1990 median value of Albany, New York, homes was $101,800. U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, supra note 128, at 788.
213. See supra note 211.
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United States." 4 In each instance prior to 1997, § 1034 distorted individual
investment decisions in at least two important ways. First, home owners were
inclined to reinvest all the proceeds from home sales into replacement homes,
thus skewing investment decisions in favor of housing over all other types of
investments. As the San Francisco hypothetical illustrates, taxpayers became
locked into home ownership, unable to move capital from housing to other
investments without adverse tax consequences. Second, in the case where a
taxpayer moved to a less expensive region, § 1034 again provided a strong
incentive for home owners to over-invest in housing by forcing taxpayers into
a larger home than they needed or wanted.
B. Inflation of Housing Prices
The rollover rule may also have contributed to the inflation of housing
prices in certain geographic regions of the United States. This phenomenon is
a function of at least two factors: (1) domestic population migration and
(2) inter-regional disparity of home values. With respect to the first factor, the
population oftheUnited States has been shifting generallytoward the "sunbelt"
areas of the country. Between 1990 and 1995, for example, the South region21 5
experienced a net domestic migration2"' of 2.09 million, and the Mountain
division of the West21 7 region showed a net domestic migration of 1.06 million
domestic residents.21 ' During that same period, in contrast, the Northeast
214. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, supra note 9, at 13; see also Education
Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Donald C. Lubick).
215. The United States Bureau of the Census includes the following states in its South
census region: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Virginia,
West Virginia, Tennessee, and Texas. POPULATION DIviSION, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE: JULY 1, 1995 TO JULY 1, 1996 (1996).
216. Net domestic migration is "the difference between domestic inmigration to an area
and domestic outmigration from it during the period." BUREAUOFT-ECENsus,supranote215.
Under that definition, the actual number of people entering an area might be substantially
higher than the net inmigrants. In addition, a region's actual population may grow due to births
and international migration, even though its net domestic migration is negative. "Inmigrants"
are "those persons who entered a specified area by crossing its boundary from some point
outside the area." BUREAUOFTHECENSUS, U.S. DEPT' OFCOM., 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION
ANDHOUSING, atB-32<<www.census.gov.prodl/90deccph4appdxb.pdf>> "'Outmigrants'
are persons who depart from a specific area by crossing its boundary to a point outside it, but
without leaving the United States." Id.
217. The United States Bureau of the Census includes the following states in its West
census region, Mountain division: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Utah, and Wyoming. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 215.
218. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 30 (1996). Those statistics measure population change from April 1, 1990 to
July 1, 1995. Id.
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region"' and the Pacific division of the West 220 region experienced significant
losses, with net domestic migrations of-1.7 million and -1.1 million, respec-
tively. 21
The price of homes demonstrates significant variation from region to
region. This interregional price disparity, coupled with domestic migration,
created the potential for the rollover rule to contribute to the inflation of
housing costs. Consistent with national migration patterns, consider a person
who moved from San Francisco, California (Pacific division of the West
region), to Houston, Texas (South region). In 1996, the average value of
existing homes in San Francisco was $25 9,082 .' Under the rollover rule, the
rational taxpayer would shop for a comparably priced home in Houston, even
though the average price of a home in Houston was only $78,444.2" Thus, the
rollover rule would encourage overspending by more than 300% in order to
avoid taxation. Over time, as millions of people migrated from one region to
another, the cost of housing would increase in those locations that experienced
a significant influx of home buyers from high-cost areas. Although many
factors may have contributed to the inflation of housing costs, the rollover rule
clearly exacerbated the problem.' 4
C. Conversion of Farmland into Suburban Housing
Finally, the rollover rule may have served as an incentive to accelerate
the conversion of farmland into new suburban housing developments. Within
many metropolitan areas, the population has been shifting from the central
cities to the suburbs. Between 1985 and 1994, for example, the suburbs
gained an annual average of 2.5 million persons due to domestic migration,
while the cities lost an average of 2.4 million persons annually.' As the
population has migrated, it has spread out to occupy more land. Between
219. The Census Bureau's Northeast region includes Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, supra note 215.
220. The Pacific division ofthe West region includes Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon,
and Washington. Id.
221. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 218, at 30. California alone suffered a net
domestic migration of-1.5 million. Id.
222. TimothyM. Ito, The Hottest Markets, U.S.NEwS&WORLDREP., Apr. 1, 1996, at 67.
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Louise Lee, Flashy Homes Overrun Wal-Mart's Town, WALL ST. J., June
27, 1997, at B 12 (describing migration of wealthy Wal-Mart vendors from expensive areas such
as Danville, California, to once-overlooked Bentonville, Arkansas; noting that longtime
residents "blame Wal-Mart's suppliers forjacking up local housing prices"; and citing rollover
rule as an incentive for new residents to buy expensive homes).
225. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., TABLE A3 ANNUAL INMIGRATION,
OUTMIGRATION, AND NET MIGRATION FOR METROPOLITAN AREAS (released December 1996)
<http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/migration/tab-a-3.txt>.
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1970 and 1990, urban population density decreased by 23%. 6 To accommo-
date this massive expansion, new homes have been built on open space or
farmland surrounding the central cities, causing negative economic, social,
and environmental impacts. 7 Overall, the United States lost 153,217 farms
between 1982 and 1987. 8
This loss of farmland, to a large extent, may be a function of free-market
forces and individual choice. But, it may also have been an unintended conse-
quence of the rollover rule. To defer taxation under the old rule, the rational
taxpayer who sold a personal residence would invest all of the gain from the
sale into a replacement home. This may have been difficult to accomplish,
particularly for those who moved from high-cost areas to less expensive
regions. 9 In that case, the new location may have had a scarcity of existing
homes expensive enough to satisfy the rollover rule. As a result, the taxpayer
would be most likely to purchase a new suburban home, often the most
expensive housing in an area."
Although commentators have attributed farmland loss to numerous fed-
eral laws and policies,"' few have blamed the rollover rule. Most notably
among those few, a Cleveland study concluded that "in metropolitan areas
where values increase in an outward direction, [the rollover rule] contributes
to urban decline by encouraging outmigration and obstructing movement
inward." 2 The next Part presents two case studies that support the three
hypotheses described above.
VI. A Tale of Two Counties: A Case Study
As this Part explains, California experienced a serious economic
depression in the early 1990s. Many left the state in search of a better place
to live, often choosing Colorado and other western states as their destination.
As they moved, Californians sold some of the nation's most expensive
226. OREGON'S DEPARTMENT OF LAND CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INDICATORS
OFURBANSPRAWL (May 1992) (citing Census: Cities Take Over U.S., STATESMANJ., Dec. 18,
1991, at 5A) <http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/-pppm/anduse/sprawl.html>.
227. See infra Part VII.B.
228. Farms, Net Change 1982-1987 (visited July21, 1997)<ftp://ftp.lib.virginia.edu/ssdc/
ccdb/ccdb.32572/tablel4.html>.
229. See infra Part VI.B.
230. Id.
231. See infra Part VII.A.
232. Thomas E. Bier & Ivan Maric, IRS Homeseller Provision and Urban Decline, 16 J.
URB. AFF. 141, 141 (1994); see also Robert H. Freilich & Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social Costs
ofSprawl, 29 URB. LAW. 183, 187-88 (1997) (explaining that capital gains home sale provision
"effectively requires reinvestment in a more expensive home, typically located in suburban
areas"); Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1098 (1996)
(describing Bier's Cleveland research as most careful study of decline of central cities and inner
suburbs); infra note 310 and accompanying text.
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homes. 33 This California exodus - which reached a peak in 1993 and 1994-
offers an opportunity to test the hypotheses of the previous Part, providing a
case study of a significant migration from high-cost to lower-cost areas of the
country. To provide a manageable snapshot of the larger migratory picture,
the study focuses on Santa Clara County, California, and Boulder County,
Colorado." California in general, and Santa Clara in particular, supplied a
substantial number of new residents to Boulder County, with the potential to
exert a measurable influence upon the Boulder housing market:
Table 1: Number of California Inmigrants v. Boulder County Home Sales
Santa Clara to California to Boulder Boulder County:
Year Boulder Migration2 " Migration23 Number of Home
Boulder MigratIorP _ _ _Sales2 7
1990 279 1113 2451
1991 218 1763 3409
1992 260 2065 4768
1993 295 2584 5547
1994 304 2742 4867
1995 240 2455 4390
1996 261 2335 4691
233. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
234. The author chose Boulder County for the case study because it had been the author's
home for many years, during which time the California migration to Colorado had been a
popular topic of news and conversation. The author selected Santa Clara County for study
because (1) each year between 1990 and 1996, it had been among the top four California
counties whose residents moved to Boulder (including also Los Angeles, Orange, and San
Diego Counties), see infra Part VI.B, and (2) of those four counties, Santa Clara provided the
best comparison to Boulder in terms of the size of its population. See BUREAU OFTHE CENSUS,
supra note 128, at 46, 60 (showing selected 1990 county populations as 8.8 million for Los
Angeles, 2.4 million for Orange, 2.4 million for San Diego, 1.4 million for Santa Clara, and
225,339 for Boulder).
235. Internal Revenue Service, County to County Migration Flows from Administrative
Recordings (1990-1996) (providing unpublished data estimating county to county migration
based upon the number of exemptions claimed by taxpayers) (on file with author).
236. Id.
237. Sales statistics were computed by the author from data supplied by Stefanie K.
Schroeder, Computer Programmer, Boulder County Assessor. See Boulder County Assessor,
Single Family and Condo/TWNHS Sales (New) for 1990-96 (July 29, 1997) [hereinafter
Boulder County New Homes Sales] (unpublished data, on file with author) (providing data for
new noncondominium homes in Boulder County); Boulder County Assessor, Single Family and
Condo/TWNHS Sales (Existing Homes) for 1990-96 (July 31, 1997) [hereinafter Boulder
County Existing Homes Sales] (unpublished data, on file with author) (providing data for
existing noncondominium homes in Boulder County).
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Data from this case study support the three hypotheses discussed in Part V,
suggesting that the rollover rule (1) encouraged new Boulder residents to
overspend on housing, (2) contributed to a dramatic increase in the cost of
Boulder housing, and (3) stimulated the demand for the construction of new,
suburban housing on farmland and open space.
A. Santa Clara County, California: 1990-96
It was the worst of times in California." Increasing unemployment,
inflation, and costs of living had combined with devastating effect upon the
state's economy, producing its most serious recession since the depression of
the 1930s.' 9 In 1991, for example, the state's average unemployment rate
was 7.7%, with some California counties staggering under unemployment
rates as high as 21.3%.240 In 1990, California was the second most expensive
state in the nation for housing, with a median home value of $195,500.24 In
that year, only 55% of the state's residents owned their own homes, a rate
considerably lower than the national average of 64%.242 One county re-
sponded dramatically to these and other negative economic conditions: On
December 6, 1994, Orange County declared bankruptcy.243 More commonly,
Californians simply left the state in vast numbers in search of a more favor-
able economic climate. From 1992 through 1996, California's net domestic
outmigration 2" exceeded that of all other states,245 with an average net domes-
tic migration exceeding -200,000.246 Other western states were the most
238. The title of Part VI and introductory sentences of Part VI.A are inspired by CHARLES
DICKENs, A TALE OF TWO CITIES 3 (Dodd, Mead & Co. 1942) (1859).
239. Alex Berenson, California's Problem is Growth, DENy. POST, Feb. 26, 1995, at DI.
240. BUREAuOFTHECENSUS, supra note 128, at 67. The state's highestrate ofunemploy-
ment (21.3%) occurred in Imperial county. Id.
241. Id. at 8 (providing median value of specified owner-occupied housing units, exclud-
ing mobile homes, houses with business or medical office, houses on 10 or more acres, and
housing units in multi-unit buildings).
242. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., CENSUS OF HOUSING (noting that
California reached its 58.4% "high water mark" in 1960).
243. See Dennis J. Aigner, Orange County: Pre and Post-Bankruptcy, UC INSIGHT
(Spring 1995) <http:llwwv.gsm.uci.edu/whatsnew/springucinsight95/uc4.html>. Commenta-
tors blamed both the county's managers and the economic climate. See id. (calling Orange
County a "laboratory, [sic] of financial mismanagement"); see also Debt Issuance and Invest-
ment Practices of State and Local Governments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Capital
Mkts., Sec., and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises ofthe House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs.,
104th Cong. 12 (1995) (statement of Kurt Sjoberg, Auditor, State of California) (finding that
Orange County employed high risk investment strategies that "reacted.. .with the 300 basis
point increase in interest" to reach "a critical flashpoint").
244. See supra note 216.
245. See Paul Larmer & Ray Ring, Can Planning Rein in a Stampede?, HIGH COUNTRY
NEws, Sept. 5, 1994, at 6.
246. DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH UNIT, CALIFORNIA STATE DEP'T OF FINANCE, HIsTORIcAL
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popular destinations, becoming the new homes of more than 150,000 Califor-
nians between 1992 and 1993.247 Colorado alone was the target of approxi-
mately 23,500 California outmigrants during that two-year period.24
If any California county could be immune from the state's financial
difficulties, it might be Santa Clara. Situated at the southern tip of San
Francisco Bay, the county begins less than 30 miles south of the city of San
Francisco. 21 9 Santa Clara boasts of a well-educated population"5 and is the
home of prestigious Stanford University.25" ' In addition, the county has
spawned a sophisticated high-technology center known as Silicon Valley. 2
Despite its advantages, however, Santa Clara also suffered from the California
recession. The county's unemployment rate rose from 5.5% in 1991"5 to
COUNTY POPULATION ESTIMATES AND COMPONENTS OF CHANGE JULY 1, 1990-1996 (1997)
[hereinafter DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH]. California's net domestic migration figures are as
follows:






Id. Overall, however, the state's population increased during the 1991-1996 period from 30.5
million to 32.3 million. Id. The increase was due to immigration from other countries and to
a natural population increase (the amount by which births exceed deaths). Id.
247. Larmer & Ring, supra note 245, at 6. Between 1992 and 1993, Californians moved
to the following western states in the following numbers (rounded off to the nearest hundred):
Nevada(29,200), Washington (27,100), Oregon (25,400), Colorado (23,500), Arizona (20,900),
Idaho (11,300), Utah (9,400), New Mexico (4,600), Montana (2,000), and Wyoming (800).
Id. Larmer & Ring's statistics are derived from driver's license transfers recorded by the
California Department of Motor Vehicles and may underestimate the actual number of people
moving from state to state by excluding nondrivers and those who failed to surrender their
California licenses after leaving the state. Id.
248. Id.
249. See RAND MCNALLY ROAD ATLAS 11 (1997).
250. In 1990, of the county's residents 25 years of age and older, 82% were high school
graduates and 32.6% were college graduates (compared to a national average of 20.3%).
Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Com., USA Counties 1996 CD-ROM [hereinafter USA
Counties].
251. In 1997, Stanford University ranked fifth among 228 national universities. AMER-
ICA'S BEST COLLEGES 1998, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 70-71 (defining national universities
based on categories established by Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching).
252. See generally Silicon Valley Online (visited Feb. 16, 1998) <http:llwww.silvalonline.
com/history.html> (providing area profile).
253. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 128, at 67.
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6.8% in 1993," 4 and, like the rest of the state, Santa Clara suffered a dramatic
exodus. From 1991 through 1996, the county had an average annual net loss
of 11,155 domestic residents, approximately 7% of the county's population
during that period. 5
B. Boulder County, Colorado: 1990-96
Meanwhile, it was the best of times in Colorado. In 1991, the state's
unemployment rate was 5%,16 with employment growing steadily from 1990
through 1995 at an annual rate of 3.9%. " The cost of living was reasonable:
In 1990, the median value of a Colorado home was $82,700,8 less than half
the cost of a home in Califomia.' 9 In response to the state's strong economy,
Colorado's population grew dramatically. Between 1990 and 1995, Colorado
was the fourth fastest-growing state in the nation, with a 13.7% increase in
total population.260 Many of the new residents were outmigrants from Cali-
254. CALiFORNIA DEP'T OF FINANCE, EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT, CALIFORNIA
AND METROPOLrrAN AREAS (last modified Nov. 6, 1996) <http://www.dof.ca.gov/html/fs_
data/stat-ab5/table5/cl.htm>.
255. DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH, supra note 246. Santa Clara County's net domestic
migration figures are as follows:







256. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 128, at 67.
257. Doris Drury & Wilson Kendall, Colorado's Economy, DENV. Bus. J., May 17, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 10036242 (explaining that Colorado's economy in the 1990s was
rebounding "from the agricultural, oil and gas, and mining bust of the early 1980s"). During
1993, 68,600 new jobs were created in Colorado, the highest increase since 1984. Boom With
a View, SUNDAY TIMES (Longmont), Mar. 27, 1994, at Al.
258. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 128, at 66 (providing median value of owner-
occupied housing, excluding mobile homes, houses with business or medical office, houses on
10 or more acres, and housing units in multi-unit buildings).
259. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. In 1990, the Colorado rate of home
ownership was 62.2%. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 242.
260. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 218, at 7 (measuring state population change
from April 1, 1990, to July 1, 1995). With the exception of Georgia and Texas, eight of the ten
fastest-growing states for the period 1990 to 1995 were located in the West. Colorado's growth
for the 1990-95 period was exceeded only by that of Nevada (27.3%), Idaho (15.5%) and
Arizona (15.1%). Id The annual growth rates in the West were comparable to that of Africa
(2.93%), which has experienced the highest annual population growth of any continent in the
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fornia. From 1991 through 1996, over 140,000 Californians moved to Colo-
rado.
2 61
Boulder County shared in the state's economic boom, with a 1991 unem-
ployment rate of only 3.5%.262 The favorable economy was well-publicized.
Money magazine named Boulder as one of the nation's top twenty areas in
which to live.263 Similarly, Entrepreneur magazine listed the Boulder/Long-
mont area2  as one of the nation's top "entrepreneurial hot spots," citing its
stable business climate, well-known university, high-technology employers,
and "atmosphere of innovation and experimentation." 261 The area attracted
recognition for noneconomic reasons as well. Nestled against the foothills of
the Rocky Mountains, the Boulder area contains 65,000 acres of parks and
open space.2' In 1989, Outside magazine proclaimed the city of Boulder "the
world. See Richard D. Lamm, The RealBind ls Too Many People Everywhere, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, Sept. 5, 1994, at 19. In 1993, for example, annual western growth rates were as follows:
Nevada (3.9%), Idaho (3.1%), Colorado (2.9%), Utah and Arizona (2.7%), New Mexico
(2.2%), and Montana (2.1%). See id.
261. Telephone Interview with Susan Woods, Office Manager II, Driver Services, Colo.
Dep't of Motor Vehicles (July 29, 1997). The estimated annual number of persons moving
from California to Colorado are as follows:








Id. The above figures are based upon the annual number of California driver's licenses sur-
rendered in Colorado and therefore may underestimate the total number of inmigrants to
Colorado. A Boulder County Commissioner estimated that about one-third of the state's new-
comers were from California. Erik Wilmsen, Will Quake Send People to Colorado?, COLO.
DAILY, Jan. 19, 1994, at 1.
262. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, supra note 128, at 67.
263. Carla Fried, The Best Places to Live in America, MONEY, July 1997, at 132, 140
(ranking top 20 metropolitan areas of United States).
264. Boulder County includes a city of the same name. All references to "Boulder" refer
to the county, unless clearly specified otherwise.
265. Karen Axelton et al., The Nation's Entrepreneurial Hot Spots, ENTREPRENEUR, Oct.
1996, at 122, 139-40 (listing city of Boulder as second-best small city in nation for small
business).
266. BOULDERCHAMBEROFCOM., BOULDER, COLORADODEMOGRAPICS 2 (1997) (listing
recreational amenities of park land (6970 acres), city open space (25,000 acres), and county
open space (33,000 acres)).
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sports town" of the nation.267 Due in part to such favorable publicity, the
county grew rapidly. From 1990 through 1996, the county's population
increased approximately 16%,268 gaining an average of almost 2,900 more
domestic residents each year than it lost.269 By far, the largest source of
newcomers was California, supplying the county with an average of over two
thousand new residents annually. By 1995, 10% of the population of the
county's largest city (Boulder) consisted of inmigrants from California.' In
an effort to understand the effects of the rollover rule, the following sections
267. Stu Stuller, 15 Sporting Towns, OuTsIDE, May 1989, at 85, 85.
268. The county's annual population was as follows:








Telephone Interview with Larry Mugler, Director, Development Services Division, Denver
Regional Council of Governments (July 22, 1997).
269. USA Counties, supra note 250 (recording net domestic migration of 14,333 for 5-year
period 1990 to 1995). The actual number of new domestic residents would be significantly
larger than the net domestic migration of 14,333.
270. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. Almost half of the Californiato Boulder
migrants were supplied by the four counties of Los Angeles, Orange, San Diego, and Santa
Clara. The following table shows the total annual migration to Boulder County from those four
California counties:








See Internal Revenue Service, supra note 235.
271. CENTERFORPOLICYAND PROGRAM ANALYSIS, CrrY OF BOULDER, BOULDER CrIZEN
SuRvEY30 (1995).
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discuss the Boulder County housing market during the 1990-96 California
migration.
1. Over-Investment in Housing
The first hypothesis suggests that the rollover rule would encourage over-
investment in housing, particularly by those who moved to Boulder County
from more expensive areas of the country. Survey results provide some
support for this prediction. Residents of a large-lot, luxury development in
Boulder County were polled by mail concerning the factors that influenced
them to purchase homes in that development.2 2 Virtually all respondents had
complied with the buy-up requirement of the rollover rule, and only one
household had paid a capital gains tax on the profit from the sale of its former
residence. Approximately half of those responding stated that tax consider-
ations had influenced their home purchase decisions. In particular, those
respondents indicated that they wanted to buy a home at least as expensive as
their former home to avoid taxation or that they would have considered buying
a smaller or less expensive home but for the potential tax penalty.27 One
respondent exclaimed, "[The tax laws have] driven our lives. It took building
a custom home to buy one expensive enough to avoid the [capital gains
tax]."274 The remaining half of the respondents stated that tax considerations
had not influenced their choice of home. 75 Anecdotal data supplied by
Boulder real estate agents confirmed that tax avoidance may have been a
significant motivation for those who chose to "trade up" to more expensive
homes. 76
272. Surveys were mailed to 73 households in the Somerset development in Boulder
County, with 23 responses returned to the author. The survey is reproduced as Appendix A,
infra p. 468. A 1997 promotional brochure described the development as "Boulder County's
most elegant executive community" with home prices ranging from $800,000 to $1,000,000.
273. The survey asked, "Did the tax laws have any influence on your decision to buy your
current home?" Appendix A, infra p. 468. Of 23 responses, 11 checked one or both of the
following answers: (a) "Yes, we wanted to buy a home at least as expensive as our former
home so that we wouldn't have to pay the capital gains tax," and/or (b) "Yes, if it weren't for
the capital gains tax, we might have considered buying a smaller or less expensive home."
Responses to Home Purchase Survey conducted by the author (1997) (unpublished data, on file
with author).
274. Responses to Home Purchase Survey, supra note 273.
275. Twelve respondents indicated that tax considerations had not influenced their housing
decision. Perhaps these respondents simply wanted to purchase their dream homes, without
regard to tax avoidance. A 1993 housing survey conducted by the Census Bureau suggested
that 25% of recent movers cited their desire for a better or larger home as the reason for leaving
their previous unit. CENsus BUREAU, U.S. DEP'TOFCOM., AMERICAN HOUSING SURvEY, 1993
AHS-N DATA CHART (1993).
276. The author conducted telephone interviews of five Boulder County real estate agents
for luxury developments. All agreed that the capital gains tax potentially influenced buyers to
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2. Inflation of Housing Prices
In 1990, the average Santa Clara home cost more than twice as much as
a home in Boulder County, with prices remaining well above their Boulder
counterparts through 1996:
Table 2: Average Value ofNoncondominium Homes in
Santa Clara and Boulder








Consistent with the second hypothesis, one would expect newcomers from
Santa Clara to over-invest in housing, contributing to an inflation of home
prices in Boulder County.
Data derived from actual home sales support that prediction. Boulder
housing prices increased sharply, particularly during 1992 to 1994 when the
migration from California and Santa Clara County reached its peak. As the
price of Boulder housing approached that of Santa Clara, the rate of increase
diminished:
purchase more expensive homes than they might otherwise have purchased. Telephone Inter-
view with Vicki Moselle, Colorado Landmark Realtors (Aug. 1997) (noting that people bought
more house than they wanted under rollover provision, and some will probably scale down after
rule is no longer in effect); Telephone Interview with Tracie Thede, Griffin Mktg., Inc. (Aug.
1997) (claiming that buyers from northern California, in particular, were interested in spending
all of proceeds from sale of their former residences); Telephone Interview with Terri Johnson,
RE/MAX of Boulder, Inc. (Aug. 1997) (asserting that capital gains tax may have helped to
create luxury home market, causing people to reinvest all of their sale proceeds in replacement
home, even if they would prefer to buy smaller home); Telephone Interview with Stan Meade,
Wild View Land Co. (Aug. 1997) (stating that capital gains tax induced some people, particu-
larly those from California, to buy up); Telephone Interview with Bets Sholten, Perry & Butler
Realty, Inc. (Aug. 1997) (noting that 1997 changes in capital gains tax may induce some home
owners to "trade down").
277. Telephone Interview with John Karevoll, Financial Editor, DataQuick Info. Sys., La
Jolla, California (Sept. 25, 1997) (providing median value).
278. Boulder County New Homes Sales, supra note 237 (providing mean values, rounded
to nearest $500); Boulder County Existing Homes Sales, supra note 237 (same).
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Table 3: Annual Change in Boulder County Home Sale Prices279







Anecdotal evidence also supports the prediction, consistent with the view that
California migrants drove up the price of housing throughout the West. In a
whimsical essay, one western newspaper defined the term "Californian" as an
"imprudent spender single-handedly responsible for inflated values of real
property.-
280
3. Conversion of Farmland into Suburban Housing
As a third unintended consequence, the rollover rule may have acceler-
ated the conversion of Boulder County farmland into suburban housing devel-
opments. To minimize their tax liability, newcomers from California needed
to purchase homes of value greater than or equal to the value of their former
residences. But - at least in the early years of the California migration - the
average Boulder County home simply did not cost enough to satisfy this
requirement. As a result, the rollover rule limited the new residents' housing
choices in two important ways.
First, the rule discouraged the inmigrants from moving into neighbor-
hoods within the city limits"' because the average city home cost far less than
the average home in Santa Clara County:
279. Id.
280. John Walker, Excerpts From a New West Dictionary, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Sept.
29, 1997, at 16. Another article, published by the same newspaper, described the influx of
Californians into Montana as creating a "demand on real estate [that] has shot home prices up."
See Cindy Wehling, Montana Town Puts Out Unwelcome Mat, HIGH COUNTRYNEWS, Jan. 24,
1994 <http://www.hcn.org/1994/jan24/dir/wr2.html>. The article also noted agrowing animos-
ity toward the wealthy new residents, citing the T-shirt slogan, "Beautify Montana: Put a
Californian on a bus." Id.
281. Boulder County includes the following incorporated cities and towns: Boulder,
Broomfield, Erie, Lafayette, Longmont, Louisville, Lyons, and Superior. BOULDER COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS' OFFICE, GROWTH WATCH 6-7 (Summer 1997) [hereinafter GROWTH WATCH].
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Table 4: Average Sale Price ofNoncondominium Homes - City v. County
Year Santa Clara 
Boulder Count
s3
County 2  Unincorporated County Within City Limits
1990 $260,500 $152,500 $120,500
1991 251,500 159,000 125,500
1992 250,000 179,500 139,500
1993 247,000 212,500 159,500
1994 245,000 257,000 186,000
1995 251,500 252,500 189,000
1996 264,000 277,000 196,000
Instead, the new residents would tend to search for housing in the unincorpo-
rated county, where prices more closely approximated those of Santa Clara
County:
Figure 1:












1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
-K--Santa Clara
E3 Boulder County: Unincorporated
* Boulder County: Within City Limits
Second, beyond forcing the new residents into the county, the rollover
rule required them to purchase new rather than existing county homes. Even
282. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
283. Boulder County New Homes Sales, supra note 237 (mean sale price of noncondo-
minium homes); Boulder County Existing Homes Sales, supra note 237 (same).
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in unincorporated Boulder County, the average county resale did not cost
enough to avoid taxation until sometime in 1994:
Table 5: Average Sale Price ofNoncondominium County Homes - New v. Resale
a Unincorporated Boulder Coun
85
Year Santa Clara Couny2 84
I _INew Resale
1990 $260,500 $226,500 $141,500
1991 251,500 208,500 151,500
1992 250,000 243,000 170,500
1993 247,000 270,000 201,500
1994 245,000 337,500 243,000
1995 251,500 350,000 240,500
1996 264,000 346,500 265,000
Thus, to satisfy the rollover rule and minimize their tax liability, the new resi-
dents needed to purchase new homes located in unincorporated county areas:
Figure 2:




S--Bouder: Existing County Home
284. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
285. Boulder County New Homes Sales, supra note 237 (providing mean sale price of
noncondominium homes, rounded to nearest $500); Boulder County Existing Homes Sales,
supra note 237 (same).
450
REQUIEMFOR THE ROLLOVER RULE 451
Throughout the peak of the California migration period, only new homes
in unincorporated Boulder county were of equal or greater value than Santa
Clara homes. Therefore, as predicted by the third hypothesis, compliance
with the rollover rule by new residents from Santa Clara and other expensive
areas would lead to the conversion of farmland and open space into new
housing developments. 286 Construction data support this prediction, as the
peak California migration period coincides with an increase in new residential
construction in Boulder County:









Many of the new homes were built on rural or agricultural lands. Between
1959 and 1987- the generation during which the rollover rule was in effect -
Boulder County experienced a 46% decline in total farmland and rangeland,
a 38% decline in total cropland, and a 47% decline in irrigated land.288
Between 1975 and 1997, the area of cities and towns in Boulder County more
than doubled from thirty-nine square miles to eighty-one square miles, ex-
panding into the farmlands of the county.28 9 On a statewide level, Colorado
agricultural land is now converted to housing and suburban services at an
average rate of ten acres per hour, 250 acres per day, or 90,000 acres per
286. The construction of new homes within the city limits might also lead to the destruc-
tion of farmland, particularly if constructed upon newly annexed land along the city/county
periphery. Due to Boulder County's land use regulations, property must be annexed to an
adjacent city or town priorto high-density development. See GROWTH WATCH, supra note 281,
at 1 (noting that "annexations result in the bulk of Boulder County's growth" and that "[s]ince
1984, Boulder County communities have annexed.more than 12,800 acres, or 20 square miles
of land, for development").
287. Boulder County New Homes Sales, supra note 237 (providing sales data for non-
condominium homes).
288. RESOURCE ANALYSIS SECTION, COLORADO DEP'T OF AGRIC., COLORADO AGRICUL-
TURAL LAND TRENDS (1994).
289. GROWTH WATCH, supra note 281, at 3.
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year.29° This loss of farmland is difficult to justify, particularly if it was
simply the unanticipated consequence of a poorly understood provision of the
tax code.
Thus, this case study supports the hypothesis that the rollover rule caused
serious, unintended consequences to the American taxpayer and to the Amer-
ican landscape. The tax incentive for the destruction of farmland was primar-
ily a function of increasing residential prices as one moves out of the central
cities and into the county. As this study illustrates, the phenomenon of
expensive suburbs surrounding a less expensive city center was not confined
to aging, industrial cities.29 Rather, the rollover rule acted as a magnet to
deter investment from vibrant cities292 as well as those in decline.
VII. Rethinking Suburbia: The American Dream Becomes the
American Nightmare
The American landscape is vast and startling in its beauty. The Founders
treasured this seemingly inexhaustible supply of land, envisioning a nation of
yeoman-farmers as the pillar of a democratic society.293 Thomas Jefferson
proclaimed passionately that "[t]hose who labor in the earth are the chosen
people of God .... Corruption of morals in the mass of cultivators is a
phenomenon of which no nation has furnished an example." '294 The post-
industrial vision is a variation of the Jeffersonian ideal, recognizing that most
290. COLORADO DEP'T OF AGRIC. & THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON AGRICULTURAL
LANDS, A REPORT ON THE CONVERSION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND IN COLORADO (1995).
291. See supra Part VI.B.III.
292. Despite the rollover rule, the city of Boulder's population continues to increase:






1997 Boulder County Almanac, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, June 22, 1997, Special Section, at
23.
293. See JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, HOME FROM NOWHERE 28 (1996) (noting that
American desire for individual dwelling place in natural landscape developed, in part, as
response to European system under which "[o]rdinary people not already in possession of land
as yeomen had little hope of acquiring a scrap [of land] of their own").
294. Steven C. Bahls, Preservation ofFamily Farms -The WayAhead, 45 DRAKEL. REv.
311, 323 (1997) (citing BASIC WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 161 (Philip S. Foner ed.,
1944)).
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Americans will toil as employees rather than as farmers.29 Nevertheless, a
romanticized image of country living continues to inform our collective vision
of the ideal life. The modem American Dream, perhaps, can be described
generally as the desire to live in a single-family home on a large suburban lot,
tucked away in a wooded cul-de-sac neighborhood a secure distance from the
crime and turmoil of the city.
A splendid ideal, the dream has persisted, in one form or another, for
over two hundred years. Nevertheless, one can characterize the modem incar-
nation of the Jeffersonian vision as an American nightmare. The dream of
suburban home ownership is woefully inadequate in at least two respects.
First, it has remained an elusive goal, unattainable for many Americans. And
second, the dream has many hidden economic, social, and environmental costs
that are not borne by those who enjoy suburban life. In short, the dream
celebrates a nonsustainable lifestyle, available only to an increasingly elite
segment of the population.296
A. The Causes of Sprawl
The pursuit of suburban life has lead to what many commentators de-
scribe as "suburban sprawl." In 1974, a landmark study on residential devel-
opment patterns - The Costs of Sprawl - used the term "sprawl" to describe
low-density, single-family homes sited at the urban fringe of metropolitan
areas.297 Over time, the definition has generally been stated in a less neutral
fashion, recognizing the negative impacts of sprawl development: It is "poorly-
planned, land-consumptive, automobile-dependent [and] designed without
regard to its surroundings." '298 Two features are particularly striking as depart-
295. By 1995, less than 3% of the population engaged in farming. Bahls, supra note 294,
at 323 (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE
UNITED STATES 417 (1995)).
296. See Frug, supra note 232, at 1073 (arguing that prevailing urban and zoning policies
have had "enormously destructive consequences for American life," including the "simulta-
neous creation of poor African American neighborhoods and of privileged, mostly white, sub-
urbs"). For suggested alternatives to modem sprawl, see KUNSTLER, supra note 293, at 29;
Andres Duany & Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, The Second Coming of the Small Town, UTNE
READER, May-June 1992, at 97. See generally PETER CALTHORPE, THE NEXT AMERICAN
METROPOLIS: ECOLOGY, COMMUNrrY, AND THEAMERICAN DREAM (1991); PETER KATZ, THE
NEWURBANIsM: TOwARDANARCHrrECTUREOFCOMMUNITY (1991). For legislative attempts
to control sprawl, see OR. REv. STAT. §§ 197.005-.860 (1991) (leading to establishment of
"urban growth boundaries" that geographically contain urban development from encroachment
upon rural land).
297. REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORP., THE COSTS OF SPRAWL, ExECUTIvE SUMMARY 2
(1974) [hereinafter THE COSTS OF SPRAwL]. The study was prepared by the Real Estate
Research Corporation for the Council on Environmental Quality, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, and the Environmental Protection Agency.
298. Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 232, at 185, quoted in LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC
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ures from the traditional town or city. First, residential uses are segregated
from industrial and commercial uses, with the result that people do not live
within convenientproximitytowork, retail businesses, and communitymeeting
places such as libraries and coffee shops. And second, development is spread
out over large tracts of land, making it virtually impossible for residents to
walk to their destinations. In sum, sprawl developments contain all of the ele-
ments of the traditional town - such as housing communities, office parks, and
shopping centers - but those elements have been combined poorly.299
What causes sprawl? Contrarytowhat intuition might suggest, population
growth probably has not been a direct cause of this phenomenon. In the Chi-
cago metropolitan area, for example, land use increased by 46% in a twenty-
year period, even though the population increased by only 4%.3" Similarly, in
the Kansas City metropolitan region, land development increased by 110%
between 1960 and 1990, although urban and suburban population increased by
only 29%."' Thus, factors other than population growth contribute to sprawl.
Originally, sprawling development patterns may have been a rational
response to the industrial revolution. As late-nineteenth century cities became
polluted and overcrowded, people sought refuge in the surrounding country-
side just outside the urban boundaries.30 2 As one commentator explains,
"Americans' historical experience of city life has been of a bleak, relentless,
noisy, squalid, smoky, smelly, explosively expanding, socially unstable, de-
humanizing sinkhole of industrial foulness congested with ragtag hordes of
gabbling foreigners. 3 3 The urban exodus gained momentum in the 1920s as
the increased availability of the automobile made suburban life a feasible
alternative for many urban dwellers. 3' The suburban migration gained addi-
POLICY, ALTERNATIVES TO SPRAWL 4 (1995).
299. Richmond, supra note 3, at 331 n.23 (citing Duany & Plater-Zyberk, supra note 296,
at 97) ("These elements have the makings of a great cuisine, but they have never been properly
combined.").
300. Frug, supra note 232, at 1097 (citing Paul Glastris, A Tale of Two Suburbias, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 9, 1992, at 34).
301. As a result, average density declined from approximately 3,500 people per square
mile to about 2,150 per square mile. Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 232, at 185 (citing Chris
Lester & Jeffrey Spivak, Divided We Sprawl: Suburbs Can't Escape the Cost of Separation,
K.C. STAR, Dec. 17, 1995, at A-I; Jeffrey Spivak & Chris Lester, Divided We Sprawl: US.
Fosters Society of Separation, K.C. STAR, Dec. 18, 1995, at A-10); see also OREGON DEP'TOF
LAND CONSERvATION & DEV., INDICATORS OF URBAN SPRAWL (May 1992) <http://darkwing.
uoregon.edu/-pppm/landuse/sprawl.html> (noting that land use in Portland metropolitan area
increased by 300% between 1940 and 1970, even though region's population increased by only
100% during that same time period).
302. See Richmond, supra note 3, at 328.
303. KUNSTLER, supra note 293, at 25.
304. See Richmond, supra note 3, at 329.
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tional force during the economic boom that followed World War II.3"5
At least in the beginning, sprawl reflected the free will of the American
people: It was the cumulative manifestation of numerous individual choices
of where to live. Over time, however, those choices became more a product
of government policy than of free market forces, as numerous laws created
incentives for the continuation of sprawl development. Commentators have
identified a panoply of federal policies that have promoted sprawl, generally
in the name of the American Dream:3  Home mortgages secured by the
Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration generally
favored buyers who purchased new suburban homes;307 the Federal Aid High-
way Act funded an interstate highway system that made suburban fringe areas
accessible and developable;0 8 and the home mortgage interest deduction of
the federal tax code provided an incentive for taxpayers to purchase expensive
suburban homes in order to maximize the benefit of the deduction.309 Con-
spicuously missing from the traditional litany, however, is § 1034 of the
Code.31 0 Local governments, too, have been blamed for promoting sprawl, by
305. Id. (describing post-World War II migration as "dramatic, extraordinarily consistent,
four-decade process characterized by a massive shift in the location and design of housing,
shopping, work places and jobs, which is projected to continue for the foreseeable future").
306. See generally KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIERS: THE SUBURBAN-
IZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985); Lee R. Epstein, Where Yards are Wide: Have Land
Use Planning andLaw Gone Astray?, 21 WM. & MARYENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 345, 353-66
(1997); James A. Kushner, The Reagan Urban Policy: Centrifugal Force in the Empire, 2
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. 209 (1982).
307. Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 232, at 186-87 (citing NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN
PROBLEMS - FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION AND URBAN HOUSING, BUILDING THE AMERICAN
CITY399-407 (1968)); see also JAMES HOWARDKUNSTLER, THEGEOGRAPHYOFNOWHERE 102
(1993);-Richmond, supra note 3, at 330 (citing HOUsINGFORALL UNDER LAw 17 (Richard P.
Fishman ed., 1978)).
308. Freilich & Peschoff, supra note 232, at 187 (citing Larry Bourne, A Hennakie
Perspective on Urb. Decline andPopulation Deconcentration, 1 URB. GEOGRAPHY 39 (1980);
NATIONAL COMM'N ON URB. PROBS., BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 231 (1968)); see also
Richmond, supra note 3, at 329-30.
309. Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 232, at 187; see also Bier & Maric, supra note 232,
at 142.
310. See Stephen Gurko, Federal Income Taxes and Urban Sprawl, 48 DENV. L.J. 329
(1972) (omitting § 1034 from list of federal income tax provisions that promote sprawl). Three
noteworthy exceptions are Bier & Maric, supra note 232, at 153 (concluding from their case
study of the Cleveland metropolitan area that § 1034 "encourages outmigration [from central
cities into surrounding suburbs] and obstructs movement inward in metro areas like Cleveland
where home values increase in an outward direction"); Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 232, at
187-88 (briefly stating that capital gains provision "effectively requires reinvestment in a
more expensive home, typically located in suburban areas"); and Oliver A. Houck, The Water,
the Trees, andthe Land: Three Nearly Forgotten Cases that Changedthe American Landscape,
70 TUL. L.REV. 2279, 2309 n.176 (1996) (linking suburban sprawl to "real estate sale roll-
overs").
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failing to manage growth aggressively and by permitting new developments
that do not pay their own capital infrastructure costs.31" '
The common law, as well as federal and local policies, has contributed
to the development of open land. Justices of the Supreme Court- like federal
legislators - have been captivated by the American Dream and have been
moved to near-poetic rhetoric in defense of suburbia. In 1974, Justice
Douglas eloquently defended the suburban landscape, describing it as:
[a] quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles
restricted.... The police power is not confined to elimination of filth,
stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family
values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people.3"2
Although Justice Douglas may have intended to protect rural sanctuaries from
the encroachments of urban life, his opinion has had the opposite result by
upholding sprawl-producing single-family zoning ordinances.
In sum, as numerous laws and policies institutionalized sprawl, individual
choice was restricted. As a result, future generations may be unable to choose
alternatives to sprawl without paying a substantial price in terms of lost
subsidies and tax benefits.
B. The Hidden Costs of Sprawl
Despite the appeal of suburban housing developments, they impose
formidable - often hidden - costs upon society. The problem is difficult to
resolve, however, because, from the perspective of the individual home owner,
sprawl development is often an economically efficient means of providing
housing." 3 New homes built upon former farmland can provide "more home
for the money" because land prices generally decrease as one moves farther
from the core of the metropolitan area.3" 4
311. Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 232, at 188 (citing JOINT ECON. COMM., U.S. CON-
GRESS, HARD CHOICES, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE STUDY (Feb.
1984); NANCY S. RULEGE, PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE AS A NATIONAL CONCERN: REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON PUBLIC WORKS IMPROVEMENT 17-18 (1987)).
312. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (upholding under state police
power zoning ordinance that limited certain areas to single-family, large-lot homes); see also
Epstein, supra note 306, at 345 (discussing Boraas).
313. See Robert W. Burchell, Economic and Fiscal Costs (and Benefits) of Sprawl, 29
URB. LAW. 159, 163 (1997).
314. Id. at 162. As a rule of thumb, the cost ratio of an acre of developed land compared
to an acre of farmland is about 100:1. Telephone interview with David L. Carlson, Resource
Analyst, Colorado Dep't of Agric. (July 30, 1997). Suburban developments featuring large
homes on large lots may nevertheless cost moreper home than their smaller counterparts within
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However, from a long-term social perspective, sprawl calls for an eco-
nomically inefficient use of resources. Sprawl responds to a sort of centrifu-
gal force by which development moves continuously outward from the urban
center. New "edge cities" are created as commercial and industrial develop-
ments are lured to the periphery of the metropolitan region by inexpensive
land and convenient highway access. 315 In response, new bedroom communi-
ties spring up even farther from the urban center." 6 This "leapfrog" develop-
ment is inefficient and expensive, particularly in regions where the population
does not increase but simply spreads outward to occupy a greater land area. 17
The community must now maintain an ever-expanding network of roads,
public utilities, schools, and other infrastructure even as commercial enter-
prises evacuate the metropolitan core area, abandoning it to the area's poorer
citizens. How can a region pay its expanding costs with a finite supply of
money? The residents have a choice of evils: They can accept increasing
taxes and development costs, or the older core areas can be sacrificed by
allocating a decreasing share of tax revenues to them."' One study concluded
that the development costs of traditional, relatively compact communities are
approximately 44% below the costs associated with sprawl. 9 In addition, the
study found that sprawl alternatives tend to bear an increased share of their
the city limits. See infra Part VI.B.
315. Burchell, supra note 313, at 161-62 (citing ROBERTCERVERO, SUBURBANGRIDLOCK
(1986); JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CnIy: LIFE ON THE NEw FRONTIER (1991)).
316. Burchell, supra note 313, at 162.
317. See supra notes 226-27, 300-01 and accompanying text.
318. Supra note 313 and accompanying text.
319. THE COSTS OF SPRAWL, supra note 297, at 3-4. The study compared the costs of
constructing three types ofcommunities: (1) low density sprawl (representing the typical pattern
of single-family suburban development), (2) high density planned communities (clustered
residential housing and dedicated public open space), and (3) combination (an area composed
of the previous two types of housing in equal measure). Id. at 2. "Development costs" exclude
land costs, but include the costs of constructing homes, utilities, transportation, schools, public
facilities, and public open space. Id. at 3. Similarly, another study concluded that:
streets, utilities, and schools for a suburban single family development with 3
dwelling units per acre built 5 miles from sewage and water treatment plants in a
leapfrog pattern would cost $43,381 per dwelling in 1987 dollars. Building the
same development adjacent to existing development and near central facilities
would reduce costs by $11,597 per dwelling unit, a 27 percent reduction.
OREGONDEP'TOFLAND CONSERVATION&DEVELOPMENT, supra note 301 (citing CENTERFOR
URB. STUD. (PSU) AND REG'L FIN. ADVISORS, INC., DLCD'S LOCAL GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUC-
TURE FUNDING IN OREGON (1990)); see also Richmond, supra note 3, at 327 n.44 (citing Kevin
Kasowski, The Costs ofSprawl, Revisited, DEvELOPMENTS, Sept. 1992, at I (presenting conclu-
sion of Rutgers University study that sprawl development costs approximately $7-8 billion
dollars over twenty-year period)).
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own costs rather than shifting them onto the government and, ultimately, upon
taxpayers who may not desire or benefit from the new sprawl development.2
Sprawl also imposes environmental costs upon the metropolitan region.
Low density suburban communities are typically auto-dependent, with em-
ployment and commercial centers located beyond the reach of the pedes-
trian.32" ' Between 1970 and 1990, for example, sprawl proliferated as the
urban population density decreased by 23%."2 During that same period,
automobile usage increased by 98.4%, even though the population increased
by only 22 .5%.3" Resulting primarily from this increased auto usage, sprawl
generates about 80% more air pollution than does high density develop-
ment.32 Further, sprawl has a voracious appetite for open space and wildlife
habitat, consuming over four times as much residential land as high density
development.3 21 In contrast, in the high density community, over half of the
land can remain completely undeveloped while still accommodating the same
number of residents.326
In addition to its economic and environmental costs, sprawl also exacts
a social price. Farm communities are destroyed to make way for new subur-
ban housing.3 27 The unique character of individual towns dissolves into a
homogeneous mass of look-alike homes and strip malls.3 28 Residents must
320. THE COSTS OF SPRAWL, supra note 297, at 3-4.
321. In suburban neighborhoods, walking or public transportation generally are not viable
alternatives to the private automobile; a typical suburbanite, therefore, drives about three times
as many miles as someone who lives in a high density, mixed use neighborhood. See Alan
Thein Duming, Pedestrian Paradise, SIERRA, May-June 1997, at 36, 38-39 ("[P]eople in
typical households in Northwestern suburbs own one car per driver and get in their cars ten
times a day."). For a very readable and lively argument that "[a]nybody who thinks we're
going to be using cars twenty-five years from now the way we've been accustomed to using
them in the recent past ought to have his head examined," see KUNSTLER, supra note 293, at
58-80 (chapter entitled "Car Crazy").
322. OREGON DEP'T OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEv., supra note 301.
323. Id. (citing FEDERAL HIGHWAYADMIN., SELECTED HIGHWAY STATISTICS AND CHARTS
(1989)).
324. THE COSTS OF SPRAWL, supra note 297, at 4-5. Additional air pollution is also
generated by residential heating units because heating efficiency increases with the density of
development. Id.
325. Id at 2.
326. Id. If one counts the suburban backyard as a type of open space, then the typical
suburban neighborhood provides twice as much public and private land dedicated to open
space. Id. However, all of the suburban land is typically developed to some degree (bisected
by roads and serviced by public utilities) and disturbed by human presence (including pesticide
use and destruction of natural vegetation), and may therefore be of less value as wildlife habitat
than completely undisturbed land. Id.
327. See supra Parts V.C and VI.B.3.
328. See THE COSTS OF SPRAWL, supra note 297, at 13 (noting that sprawl results in
REQUIEM FOR THE ROLLOVER RULE 459
spend significantly more time in their automobiles commuting to work,
school, and social activities, creating the late twentieth-century phenomenon
of the harried "soccer mom" driving her children from place to place in the
family minivan. 29 This automobile dependence isolates those who cannot
drive - children and the elderly - confining them to their homes or making
them reliant upon others.3  It also isolates neighbor from neighbor, minimiz-
ing the social interaction generated by foot traffic and casual encounters with
other members of the community.33' Beyond that, sprawl causes more subtle,
negative social impacts by reducing the visual delight of our communities.
Few would argue that the drive to the local strip mall is as enjoyable as the
stroll through the neighborhood to a traditional downtown shopping district.
VIII. The Demise of the Rollover Rule
The rollover rule remained in effect for almost half a century, serving as
vigilant gatekeeper to the home sale preference. In theory, relief was limited
to those sellers who were able or willing to reinvest the proceeds in another
home of greater or equal value. In practice, the rule provided no meaningful
limitation on tax relief because the vast majority of home owners conformed
their behavior to its rigid strictures. 32
"haphazard spreading of urban uses in a manner which lowers the visual quality of the commu-
nity" and housing demonstrates "little design variation").
329. See Gary S. Becker, Gender Politics: YouAin'tSeen Nothin' Yet, Bus. WK., Feb. 17,
1997, at 20.
[T]he Republican Party tried to appeal during the past campaign to the traditional
married household by emphasizing family values, opposing abortion, and support-
ing middle-class tax cuts and larger deductions for children. They did succeed
reasonably well with members of intact families, including "soccer moms."
Id.
330. See Epstein, supra note 306, at 347-48 (1997) (referring to "suburban chauffeur
syndrome" under which it is impossible for suburban children to participate in community life
without the assistance of a family "chauffeur"). Similarly, other commentators argue that:
fresh air and open spaces are good for [children]. Suburban sprawl is not. Chil-
dren in the postwar suburbs are kept in an unnaturally extended state of isolation
and dependence because they live in places designed for cars rather than peo-
ple.... Imagine how the lives of children would change if the suburban house and
yard were assembled in the form of a traditional neighborhood so that kids could
visit friends, go out for a hamburger, or walk to a library on their own.
Frug, supra note 232, at 1097 (quoting Andres Duany & Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, The Second
Coming of the American Small Town, WILSON Q., Winter 1992, at 19).
331. SeeFrug, supranote232,at 1095 (assertingthatsuburbandevelopmentsperpetuate"cult
ofdomesticity," under which wife was expected to be full-time homemaker who needed protec-
tion of"safe" community thatwaseconomically and racially homogeneous) (citing GWENDOLYN
WRIGHT, BUILDINGTHE DREAM: ASOCIAL HIsTORY OF HousiNG I A MRcA 269-74(1981)).
332. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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As a product of the post-war years, the rule reflected an overly optimistic
vision that upward mobility was within the reach of most Americans. At that
time, the dominant paradigm of the American family was reflected by televi-
sion shows such as Leave it to Beaver, depicting a stable, two-parent family
living in a comfortable suburban home purchased by the steady paycheck of
the dutiful patriarch.333 To such a stereotypical family, able to buy up as the
family expanded, the rollover rule would pose no hardship. But, that one-size-
fits-all conception of the American family no longer describes today's
society,334 if indeed it ever reflected the majority of taxpayers.335 The rule
ignores many who would like to "move down" into smaller homes or rental
quarters, including single adults, single parents,33 6 early retirees,337 the unem-
ployed,33 and those who prefer a simple lifestyle.339
As explained below, the rule was dismantled in three phases spread over
a period of forty-six years. In each phase, an expansion of the home sale pref-
erence was marked by a corresponding restriction of the applicability of the
rollover limitation. There is a rough symmetry between the enactment and the
repeal of the rollover rule: In each case, both the home sale preference and its
limiting rollover rule were but minor actors in the larger drama of balancing
the budget and tax reform. As a result, Congress both enacted and repealed
the rule with a minimum of debate. Congress was largely silent on the impor-
tant issues of who should benefit from the personal residence provision, why
333. See Jo Ann Tooley et al., A Lifetime of Lucy and the Beaver, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Aug. 7, 1989, at 62 (stating that there were 234 syndicated episodes of show between
1957 and 1963).
334. See Something Happened, ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 1991, at 6, 7 ("The post-war image
of a secure family... with real incomes rising strongly, is now a useless way of thinking about
America. Nor is it any use to think of America as a place were [sic] poverty axiomatically
shrinks each decade.").
335. See Sandra D. Atchison, Ward and June -Not, Bus. WK., Nov. 23, 1992, at 15
(reviewing and explaining Stephanie Coontz, THE WAY WENEvER WERE: AVmRICAN FAMI-
LIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP (1992)). During the reign of Leave it to Beaver, one in three
American children was poor, 60% of the elderly had incomes of less than $1000, and illegiti-
mate births increased 80% between 1944 and 1955. Id.
336. Id.
337. See Christopher J. Farrell, The Labor Pool Is Deeper than It Looks, Bus. WK., Nov.
24, 1997, at 39 (noting that "labor-force participation rate of men 55 to 64 started flattening out
about a decade ago" but that it has "sharply risen since 1994").
338. See Gene Koretz, The Downside of Downsizing, BUS. WK., Apr. 28, 1997, at 26
(describing "devastating impact on employee morale" of corporate restructuring and job-
cutting, and noting that 50,182 job cuts were announced in March 1997).
339. See Connie Lauerman, Breaking Away: Voluntary Simplicity Is a New Way of
ThinkingAbout an OldProblem - Too Many Things, Too Little Time, Cin. TRIB., June 7, 1996,
at 1 (citing report by Trends Research Institute identifying "voluntary simplicity" as major trend
of 1990s).
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the benefits should be limited to that select group of home sellers who bought
up, and, most importantly, whether the rollover rule was the best mechanism
by which to achieve those goals with a minimum of adverse side effects.
A. Retreat from the Rollover Rule: § 121
For the first decade of its existence, the rollover rule remained substan-
tially intact. Its demise began in 1964 with the enactment of § 121 of the
Code.34° Under the new provision, the rollover rule did not apply to those who
had attained the age of sixty-five.34" ' Instead, qualified older home sellers were
granted an exclusion of gain from taxable income. 42 If their homes sold for
$20,000 or less, the sellers were entitled to a full exclusion and owed no tax
on the transaction.343 Alternatively, if their residences sold for more than
$20,000, the sellers were entitled to a partial exclusion of gain in the ratio of
$20,000 to the actual sales price.3" The anticipated revenue loss under § 121
was a modest ten million dollars,345 positioned in a larger package of tax cuts
expected to reduce federal revenues by up to $3.5 billion dollars.346
The $20,000 limitation reflected a congressional judgment that only the
"average and smaller homestead" seller merited a full tax exemption.347 The
provision also reflected a growing congressional awareness that the buy-up
requirement of the § 1034 rollover rule was not appropriate for all taxpayers.
Nevertheless, Congress fell short of acknowledging that the desire to buy a
smaller home was not necessarily dependent upon the age of the taxpayer:
While present law generally provides adequately for the younger individual
who is for one reason or another changing residences, it does not do so for
the elderly person whose family has grown and who no longer has need for
340. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 206, 78 Stat. 19, 38-40.
341. t
342. To qualify for the exclusion under the original version of § 121, three requirements
had to be satisfied: (a) the seller must be age 65 or older, (b) the seller must have owned and
used the property as aprinciple residence for five out of the last eight years prior to the sale, and
(c) the exclusion was available to a taxpayer and spouse only once in their lifetimes. Id.
343. Id.
344. For example, ifX sold her home for an adjusted sales price of $60,000 and realized
again of $10,000, only one-third of the gain (1/3 x $10,000 = $3,333) could be excluded from
income (based upon the ratio of $20,000 to $60,000 sales price). See H. Rep. No. 88-749, at
46 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1313, 1354. For a discussion of the partial exclu-
sion and other limitations upon tax relief, see supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
345. H.R. REP.NO. 88-749 at 48 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1313, 1356. By
1994, however, the exemption cost the federal treasury $4.7 billion. Houck, supra note 28, at
697 (citing JoINT CoMM. ON TAx'N, U.S. CONGRESS, EsTiMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDI-
TURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1994-98, at 24 (1993)).
346. H.R. REP. No. 88-749 at 48 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1313, 1356.
347. Id. at 44, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1313, 1354.
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the family homestead. Such an individual may desire to purchase a less
expensive home or move to an apartment or to a rental property at another
location. He may also require some or all of the funds obtained from the
sale of the old residence to meet his and his wife's living expenses. Never-
theless, under present law, such an individual must tie up all of his invest-
ment from the old residence in a new residence, if he is to avoid taxation
on any of the gain which may be involved.348
Thus, Congress began to question the stereotype that taxpayers would enjoy
upward mobility throughout their lifetimes.349 Nevertheless, it continued to
adhere to a rigid vision of the American family under which the typical couple
would have several children and need to buy up to keep pace with the growing
family. After the children had grown, the taxpayer and spouse would remain
in the "empty nest" until they retired at age sixty-five. At that point, the
taxpayer would "buy down" and move into an apartment or less expensive
home, presumably remaining there until death." Although that stylized con-
ception may have described many American families, it undoubtedly excluded
many other taxpayers by making numerous assumptions that no longer fit -
and may never have fit - the majority of American taxpayers.
In 1978, Congress took a second step toward dismantling the rollover rule
by amending § 121 in two relevant respects.3 1 ' First, Congress expanded the
class of taxpayers qualifying for § 121 benefits to include all those who had
attained the age of fifty-five prior to selling their primary residences.352
Second, sellers could exclude up to $100,000 (later increased to $125,000) of
gain from gross income.353 Thus, the amendment substituted an absolute
dollar limitation on tax relief for the prior limitation based upon the sales
price of the residence. This substitution had a subtle effect upon the determi-
nation of those who could qualify for the full benefit of § 121, changing the
focus from the value of the home to the amount the value had appreciated
348. Id.
349. See supra notes 333-39 and accompanying text.
350. Congress did not provide for the taxpayer who would like to move more than once
after age sixty-five, but limited the § 121 exclusion to one sale per lifetime. Revenue Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 206, 78 Stat. 19, 38-40.
351. See generally Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 404, 92 Stat. 2763, 2869.
352. § 404, 92 Stat. at 2869 (codified at I.R.C. § 121(a)(1) (prior to amendment in 1997)).
353. Id. (allowing exclusion of up to $100,000, or $50,000 of gain in case of separate
return by a married individual). These changes were prompted by the recognition that the
previous "dollar limits and age restriction [were] unrealistic in view of increasing housing
costs and decreasing retirement ages." S. REP. No. 95-1263, at 196 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6959, 6959. Subsequently, the amount of excludable gain was increased to
$125,000 ($62,500 in the case of a separate return by a married individual). I.R.C. § 121(b)(1)
(1994) (prior to amendment in 1997).
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during the seller's residence. As a result, the amended provision created the
potential for discrimination against those who had remained in their homes for
long periods of time, generating inflationary gains in excess of the statutory
limit. This result is in apparent contradistinction from the original intent of
§ 121 to provide tax relief to those of average and below-average means.354
B. Repeal of the Rule: The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
In 1997, Congress finally removed the rollover rule from the Code by
repealing § 1034."' 5 In its place, Congress amended § 121 to allow qualified
taxpayers of all ages to exclude from gross income the gain from the sale of
their homes.356 Gone are both the rollover rule of former § 1034 and the age
limitations of former § 121. Instead, the Code retains a dollar limitation upon
nontaxable gain, but increases the exclusion from $125,000 to $500,000.
3-7
The repeal of § 1034 and the rollover rule was part of a larger tax reform
package designed to implement a bipartisan balanced budget agreement.358
Among other things, Congress approved a plan to balance the federal budget
by the year 2002, implemented a $94 billion tax cut, and reduced the top rate
of taxation on capital gains from 28% to 20%."' The record is replete, how-
ever, with partisan disagreementoverpreciselywhich Americans would benefit
from the reform. The Republicans claimed that their proposal would benefit
primarily the middle class and that taxpayers earning less than $75,000 would
enjoy 76% of its benefits.36 The Democrats, in response, argued that 50% of
354. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
355. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 312, 111 Stat. 788, 836-839.
356. Id.
357. The amount of gain excluded from gross income is limited to $250,000. I.R.C.
§ 121(b)(1) (1994), as amended by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, I.R.C. § 121(b)(1) (West
Supp. 1998). In the case of qualifying couples filing joint returns, the ceiling is $500,000.
I.R.C. § 121(b)(2) (1994), as amended by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, I.R.C. § 121(b)(2)
(West Supp. 1998). In addition, to qualify for the full tax benefits of new § 121, the property
must have been owned by the taxpayer and used by the taxpayer as a principal residence during
the five-year period preceding the sale for periods aggregating two years or more. I.R.C.
§ 121(a) (1994), as amended by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, I.R.C. § 121(a) (West Supp.
1998). An additional limitation provides that the exclusion applies to only one sale or exchange
every two years. I.R.C. § 121(b)(3) (1994), as amended by Taxpayer ReliefAct of 1997, I.R.C.
§ 121(b)(3) (West Supp. 1998).
358. See 143 CONG. REc. S6782 (daily ed. June27,1997) (statement of Sen. Murray). To
implement the agreement, Congress passed companion bills that would cut taxes and reduce
spending, respectively. See Janet Hook & Sam Fulwood III, Congress Passes Tax Cut,
Spending Bills Easily, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1997, at AI 6.
359. See Hook & Fulwood, supra note 358.
360. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. H4659 (daily ed. June26, 1997) (statement of Rep. Dreier)
("So the fact is, we are there trying desperately to help those struggling middle-income wage
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the benefits of the Republican tax proposal would go to the wealthiest 5% of
Americans.36" ' Despite such political posturing, the TaxpayerReliefActof 1997
passed easily by votes of 3 89-43 and 92-8 in the House of Representatives and
inthe Senate, respectively.362 The projected revenue loss was $200-3 00 million
annually.363
The legislative history reveals three primary rationales supporting the
repeal of the rollover rule. First, Congress stated that the amendment would
simplify the record-keeping and capital gains calculations required of home
sellers.36 Second, Congress claimed that the repeal would remove the tax
incentive for over-investment in housing:
To postpone the entire capital gain from the sale of a principal residence,
the purchase price of a new home must be greater than the sales price of
the old home. This provision of present law encourages some taxpayers to
purchase larger and more expensive houses than they otherwise would in
order to avoid a tax liability, particularly those who move from areas where
housing costs are high to lower-cost areas. This promotes an inefficient
use of taxpayer's financial resources. 365
earners create greater opportunities, improve their quality of life, and things like a capital gains
tax rate reduction will do just that.").
361. 143 CONG. REc. H 4608 (daily ed. June 25, 1997) (statement of Rep. Fazio) ("Who
gets the benefits? On that there is a clear difference. The Democratic bill helps working
families. The Republican bill, I regiet, caters to the wealthy and special interests.").
362. Id. The Washington Post noted that Congress passed both the balanced budget and
tax cut plans "[w]ith stunning speed and little dissent." Eric Pianin, Budget, Tax Plans Pass
with Few Dissenters, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1997, at A14. The speed was attributed to history:
"Republicans and Democrats who spent 2V years bitterly feuding over spending and tax
policies giddily celebrated passage of the two bills that blended conflicting philosophies and
political agendas." Id. The members were "exhausted and eager to depart for the August
recess." Id.
363. FY98 Budget: Hearing on Savings & Investment Provisions Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Jane G. Gravelle, Senior Specialist in
Economic Policy, Congressional Research Service), available in 1997 WL 149061.
364. H. REP. No. 105-148, at 347 (1997); S. REP.No. 105-33, at 36 (1997) ("By excluding
from taxation capital gains on principal residences below a relatively high threshold, few
taxpayers would have to refer to records in determining income tax consequences of transac-
tions related to their house."). Contrary to those expectations, however, the amendment may
not accomplish fully the goal of simplification. Those on the "borderline" - sellers of expen-
sive homes as well as those who have owned the same residence for a long period - will still
need to keep detailed records in order to determine whether they qualify for the $500,000
exemption. See Albert B. Crenshaw, New Tax Laws Still Require Religious Record-Keeping,
WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1997, at HI ("Houses... can be very long-term investments, and while
$500,000 may seem like a lot today, inflation will certainly erode it over the years.").
365. H. REP. No. 105-148, at 347 (1997). This rationale is consistent with this article's
first hypothesis relating to the unintended consequences of the rollover rule. See supra Part
V.A. The special case of those who move from high- to low-cost housing areas is explored
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Finally, Congress wished to remove the "constraint [on] the mobility of the
elderly" imposed by the rollover requirement." Thus, almost half a century
after it enacted the rollover rule, Congress has acknowledged at least one
important unintended consequence of the rule: stimulation of national over-
investment in housing. Conspicuously absent, however, is an awareness that
the rule also promoted the inflation of housing prices and accelerated the
conversion of farmland into suburban housing.67
During the recent tax reform process, our national mistrust of unearned
income.. collided with our ideal of the home as a sacred family refuge. 69
Although the new legislation boldly repealed the rollover rule, it bears the
mark of the lingering congressional impulse to provide some limit - even if
only symbolic - upon tax preferences for capital gains. 7 Prior to the 1997
reform, fewer than 4% of all home sales resulted in taxable gains.37" ' By
expanding the home sale preference to allow up to $500,000 of nontaxable
gain,372 experts estimate that only 0.25% of all home sales will be taxed
annually.373 Why did Congress exempt 99.75% of home sellers from taxation,
but stop short of providing a full tax exemption for home sale profits? When
questioned, the Secretary of the Treasury was unable to identify clearly the
rationale for retaining the tax for a small percentage of home sellers.374 The
supra Part VI.B. See also Jon Newberry, Tax Code Fixer-Upper, 83 A.B.A. J. 97, 97 (1997)
(noting that tax change will particularly benefit people from high-cost areas such as New York
City or California who relocate to less expensive areas and who would otherwise have to buy
"more house than they really want, particularly if children are now older").
366. H. REp. No. 105-148, at 347 (1997) ("Taxpayers who would realize a capital gain in
excess of $125,000 if they sold their home and taxpayers who have already used the exclusion
may choose to stay in their homes even though the home no longer suits their needs.").
367. See supra Parts V.B-.C.
368. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
370. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
371. Education Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Donald C. Lubick).
372. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
373. Education Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Donald C. Lubick).
374. RepresentativeXavier Becerraasked "whyyou decidedto have aceiling thatprovides
a shield for $500,000 in profits for the sale of a home?" Secretary Rubin responded,
[B]y having as high a number as we did have, we've eliminated virtually all need
for people who own homes, not - and there are people with very high priced homes
it does not apply to - but almost all homeowners will no longer have to keep
records of all the little changes they make every year that then go ultimately into
determining what their basis is when they sell their home.... There's no way of
knowing with inflation rates and all the rest what that home, on a nominal base,
would be worth 40 years from now. We wanted it to be a situation where that
person didn't have to keep records and do all the kinds of things that would be
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 403 (1998)
general tenor of the debate, however, indicates a continuing ambivalence
toward capital gains. A complete tax break for capital gains remains politi-
cally and distributionally imprudent, even where the goal is to assist non-
profit-seeking home sellers.
In sum, although Congress stopped short of creating a complete tax
exclusion for home sale profits, the repeal of the rollover rule was neverthe-
less a tremendously important accomplishment. Not only will the repeal
restore the free choice of home owners to purchase whatever accommodations
best suit their needs, but it removes an insidious and unrecognized federal
incentive for the unnecessary destruction of farmland.
IX Conclusion
In 1997, Congress ended the forty-six year life of the rollover rule by
repealing § 1034 of the Internal Revenue Code, thus expanding the home sale
preference. Congress had created the predecessor of §1034 with the noble
aspiration of making the American Dream of home ownership more affordable
for deserving taxpayers, but the preference was severely weakened by the
rollover rule which required home sellers to buy increasingly expensive homes
to be eligible for the tax break.
The rollover rule bears the mark of its 1951 birth. Congress perceived
§ 1034 as simple tax relief, preventing hardship to those whose service to the
defense industry required them to move from one area of the country to
another.375 Influenced by the post-war economic boom, Congress no doubt
believed that the typical American couple would naturally buy larger homes
as their family expanded, and that the rollover rule's buy-up requirement was
well-tailored to the life of the ordinary taxpayer.376 In practice, however, the
rollover rule served as a powerful tax incentive that forced taxpayer behavior
into a rigid mold for almost half a century. That is, the congressional assump-
tion that families would purchase increasingly expensive homes became a
self-fulfilling prophecy that changed, rather than reflected, the home purchase
decisions of potentially hundreds of millions of taxpayers since 1951 ."
This confusion between tax relief and tax incentive had profound and
unintended consequences. Contrary to Congress's probable expectations, the
necessary to ultimately have to determine basis. And that was part of what led to
the choice of that number [$500,000 exclusion for married taxpayers filing joint
returns].
FY98 Budget Proposal: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong.
(1997) (statement of Robert Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury), available in 1997 WL 57072.
375. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 333-39 and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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rule encouraged taxpayers to over-invest in housing and led to the inflation of
housing prices, particularly in regions experiencing a substantial influx of new
residents from more expensive areas of the country. Decades later, Congress
recognized the first of these two detrimental effects of the rollover rule, citing
it as a factor motivating its 1997 repeal of § 1034.378 The third and most
devastating consequence of the rollover rule - the destruction of farmland at
the fringe of metropolitan areas - has not yet been widely recognized as a
direct consequence of the rule. This article is offered to remedy that defi-
ciency.
The story of the rollover rule provides several important lessons. First,
it demonstrates that seemingly innocuous legislation may have serious, hidden
flaws. Second, it reinforces the value of vigorous partisan debate. Tax reduc-
tion measures of all types have tremendous superficial appeal and tend to
generate short-term political benefits to legislators. 379 Nevertheless, such
appealing measures may have undesirable long-term consequences, such as
those caused by the rollover limitation of the home sale preference."'
The rollover story has a happy ending. Congress repealed § 1034 in 1997
as part of a broader package of tax reform measures designed to promote
"family values." Just as the enactment of the rollover rule had unintended
consequences, so also does its repeal. The unexpected beneficiary may well
be the American landscape - perhaps the greatest value that we can preserve
for future generations.
378. See supra Part VIII.B.
379. See Passell, supra note 37, at 33.
380. SeesupraPartV.
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Appendix: Home Purchase Survey
1. In what year did you purchase your home?
2. Approximate purchase price of current home and lot:
3. Approximate size ofyour current home: ft.2 (finished)
4. Where did you own your previous home (exclude temporary rentals
during new home construction)?
County: State:
5. Approximate size ofyour previous home: ft.2 (finished)
6. Approximate selling price of your previous home:
7. Were you required to pay a capital gains tax on the profit from the sale
of your previous home?
Yes: No:
8. Did the tax laws have any influence on your decision to buy your current
home? (check all applicable answers)
No
___ Yes, we wanted to buy a home at least as expensive as our former
home so that we wouldn't have to pay the capital gains tax
___ Yes, if it weren't for the capital gains tax, we might have consid-
ered buying a smaller or less expensive home
Other (please explain, using back of page if necessary)
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